Litigating Secrets:  Comparative Perspectives on the State Secrets Privilege by Setty, Sudha
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 75 | Issue 1 Article 4
2009
Litigating Secrets: Comparative Perspectives on the
State Secrets Privilege
Sudha Setty
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Comparative Perspectives on the State Secrets Privilege, 75 Brook. L. Rev. (2009).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol75/iss1/4
  201 
Litigating Secrets 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE 
SECRETS PRIVILEGE 
Sudha Setty † 
INTRODUCTION 
The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary 
privilege, which enables the government to prevent disclosure 
of sensitive state secrets in the course of litigation. The claim of 
privilege by the government, if upheld by a court, can result in 
consequences ranging from the denial of a discovery request for 
a particular document to the outright dismissal of a suit. Some 
describe the state secrets privilege as the “most powerful 
secrecy privilege available to the president” and the executive 
branch.1 Its scope is coextensive with any kind of information 
classified as “secret” or a higher level of secrecy,2 and applies to 
both criminal and civil lawsuits. 
The privilege has been invoked by every administration 
since the Supreme Court acknowledged its existence in the 
1953 case of United States v. Reynolds,3 which was based in 
large part on English precedent. The privilege has never been 
  
 † Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. 
J.D. Columbia Law School, A.B. Stanford University. I owe great thanks to those who 
discussed with me the ideas in this Article, or who reviewed and commented on drafts, 
including Leonard Baynes, Erin Buzuvis, Lauren Carasik, Matthew Charity, Robert 
Chesney, Jane Cross, Anil Kalhan, Kim Lane Scheppele, Tayyab Mahmud, Peter 
Margulies, Manoj Mate, Bruce Miller, Trevor Morrison, Giovanna Shay, and Ujjwal K. 
Singh. I am grateful for the insight, suggestions, and commentary of participants at 
the 2008 Northeast People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference and the LatCrit XIII 
Conference, where I presented earlier drafts of this Article. Finally, I thank John 
Hejduk, Jeremy Bramson, and Hanok George for their invaluable research assistance. 
 1 Press Release, Office of U.S. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Kennedy 
Introduces State Secrets Protection Act (Jan. 22, 2008) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), available at http://kennedy.senate.gov/newsroom/press_release.cfm?id= 
C56BD1D0-7AD3-46EA-9D30-A77317F28B70; see also William G. Weaver & Danielle 
Escontrias, Origins of the State Secrets Privilege 3-4 (Feb. 10, 2008) (unpublished 
paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1079364). 
 2 Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 1, at 7. 
 3 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
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clarified by statute; Congress undertook reform efforts in 2008 
out of concerns that the Bush administration overreached in its 
claims of privilege by seeking more dismissals during the 
pleadings stage, and that courts have not used a uniform 
standard to assess those claims.4 
Congress reintroduced reform legislation in February 
20095 after the Obama administration appeared to adopt the 
Bush administration’s stance in favor of a broad and sweeping 
invocation and application of the state secrets privilege.6 The 
proposed legislation is pending even as the Obama 
administration released a new policy for the Department of 
Justice, mandating a more rigorous internal review prior to 
invoking the state secrets privilege.7 
As with many other initiatives related to the 
prosecution of the war on terror, the question of the 
appropriate application of the privilege turns on the balance 
between national security and the need to preserve the rule of 
law, individual rights, liberty interests, and government 
accountability. Congress’s reform efforts continue to be 
necessary to restore the long-term appropriate balance among 
these competing interests. 
This Article considers the modern application of the 
privilege in Scotland, England, Israel, and India—an analysis 
that contextualizes both the current use of the U.S. privilege 
and the efforts at legislative reform. Such comparative analysis 
is necessary to fully understand the transnational implications 
of the U.S. application of the state secrets privilege that have 
recently come to light in litigation involving both the United 
States and England. 
This Article considers the reform efforts in the context 
of the experience of other nations. This Article concludes that 
  
 4 154 CONG. REC. S198-201 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2008) (statement by Sen. 
Kennedy on the State Secrets Protection Act). 
 5 See Press Release, Office of U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Specter, 
Feingold, Kennedy Introduce State Secrets Legislation (Feb. 11, 2009), available at 
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200902/021109b.html. 
 6 Editorial, Continuity of the Wrong Kind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at A30 
(disagreeing with the Obama administration’s decision to continue the Bush 
administration invocations of the state secrets privilege to try to have litigation against 
the government dismissed at the pleadings stage). 
 7 See Memorandum from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Heads of 
Executive Departments & Agencies (Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Holder 
Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/state-secret-
privilieges.pdf (establishing layers of internal review within the Department of Justice 
and including a new executive branch policy to report to Congress any invocations of 
the state secrets privilege). 
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the current application of the privilege follows English 
precedent and modern English practices, although English 
courts have recently expressed concern at the broad application 
of the privilege by the U.S. government. Indian practices are 
more restrictive on information disclosure than the current or 
proposed practices in the United States. Other countries that 
take precedent from the British system—including Scotland 
and Israel—mandate a more limited application of the state 
secrets privilege and conform generally to the standards 
contained in the proposed legislation. Finally, this Article finds 
that Israel, unlike the United States, further explicitly 
accounts for allegations of government human rights abuses in 
determining whether a case involving national security matters 
ought to be heard by the courts. 
Part I of this Article details the efforts to reform the 
state secrets privilege and addresses the motivation behind 
these proposed reforms in the United States, namely the desire 
to curb perceived executive branch overreaching, to create a 
uniform and workable judicial standard, and to reassert the 
rule of law in the adjudication of national security litigation. 
This Part discusses some of the most prominent cases in which 
the state secrets privilege has been invoked, where allegations 
of gross violations of human and civil rights have been quashed 
by invocation of the privilege. This Part considers and 
ultimately rejects concerns that congressional reform efforts 
impermissibly impinge on constitutionally reserved 
presidential powers,8 and also rejects concerns that a more 
restrictive privilege may lead to the unnecessary dissemination 
of sensitive information and may infringe on the constitutional 
rights of the Executive branch. 
Part II examines the history of the U.S. state secrets 
privilege, including its origins in the United Kingdom, the 
intended balancing test set forth in Reynolds, and the 
subsequent expansion of the invocation of the privilege since 
Reynolds. Although Reynolds sets forth a specific balancing test 
for determining whether a claim of privilege should be applied, 
that test has been abdicated in most instances. As currently 
applied, almost any invocation of the state secrets privilege is 
  
 8 The U.S. Supreme Court described the state secrets privilege as “the 
evidentiary state secrets privilege” in Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6, 8 (2005), making clear 
that the privilege is not a constitutionally-based privilege, but rather one developed by 
the courts, id. at 9. 
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accepted at face value and without examination of the 
documents over which the privilege is being claimed. 
Part III examines from a comparative perspective how 
the state secrets privilege has evolved in four other countries 
drawing on the English legal tradition—Scotland, England, 
Israel, and India. These countries offer a spectrum of responses 
as to the appropriate application of a state secrets privilege and 
each strikes a different balance among the interests of national 
security, liberty, and the rule of law. 
Finally, Part IV considers how the U.S. treatment of the 
state secrets privilege fits into the comparative context. Here, I 
conclude that in the interest of creating a better balance 
between the rule of law and national security concerns, the 
United States should not only consider reforming and 
clarifying the privilege, but also should consider adding an 
additional element advising courts to consider the human 
rights interests that may be at stake in a particular lawsuit. 
I. WHY REFORM THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE? 
In January 2008, a bipartisan group of senators 
introduced the State Secrets Protection Act,9 calling for the 
passage of a “safe, fair, and responsible state secrets privilege 
Act.”10 In March 2008, members of the House of 
Representatives introduced their own State Secret Protection 
Act of 2008,11 seeking to establish “safe, fair, and responsible 
procedures and standards for resolving claims of state secret 
privilege.”12 Representative Jerrold Nadler, Chairman of the 
House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties, described the need to reform the 
privilege as follows: 
If you have an Administration that is abusing civil liberties . . . 
improperly arrests someone . . . improperly tortures that person . . . 
one presumes that that Administration will not prosecute itself 
[or] . . . its own agents for those terrible acts. 
  
 9 State Secrets Protection Act of 1998, S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008); 
see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-27, El-Masri v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 
373 (2007) (No. 06-1613) (noting the importance of clarifying the application of the 
state secrets privilege). 
 10 154 CONG. REC. S93 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2008) (introduction by Sen. Ted Kennedy). 
 11 State Secrets Protection Act of 2008, H.R. 5607, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008). 
 12 Id. 
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 The normal remedy in American law—the only remedy I know 
of—is for that person, once recovered from the torture, to sue for 
various kinds of damages and in court elucidate the facts . . . and get 
some justice and perhaps bring out to light what happened so that 
that Administration would not do it again or the next one wouldn’t. 
 If, however, that lawsuit can be dismissed right at the pleadings 
stage by the assertion of state secrets, and if the court doesn’t look 
behind the assertion . . . and simply takes it at face value . . . the 
government says state secrets would be revealed and it would harm 
the national security if this case went forward, therefore case 
dismissed, which seems to be the current state of the law—if that 
continues and we don’t change that, what remedy is there ever to 
enforce any of our constitutional rights?13 
Although the impetus for legislative reform appeared to 
weaken with the election of President Obama,14 recent 
invocations of the privilege by the Obama administration and 
pressure applied by the Obama administration to foreign 
governments making their own state secrets determinations 
prompted Congress to reintroduce similar legislation in 
February 2009.15 
By re-assessing the privilege, Congress is taking an 
important first step toward providing additional rule-of-law 
protections against executive branch overreaching, 
maintaining the judicial role in executive oversight, and 
strengthening the protections for individual litigants bringing 
suit against the government.16 In doing so, Congress 
appropriately took into account the changing national security 
landscape in the years since the recognition by the Supreme 
Court of the U.S. privilege in United States v. Reynolds.17 
  
 13 State Secrets Protection Act of 2008: Hearing on H.R. 5607 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 77 (2008) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 14 Mark Mazzetti & William Glaberson, Obama Issues Directive to Shut 
Down Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009 (quoting Obama administration 
representatives as highlighting the importance of “protecting our national security, 
respecting the Geneva Conventions and the rule of law, and respecting the existing 
institutions of justice in this country”). 
 15 See Press Release, Office of U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy, supra note 5 
(reintroducing state secrets reform legislation and setting forth concerns regarding 
executive branch use of the privilege). 
 16 William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive 
Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 90 (2005) (arguing that the courts should clarify the 
privilege to enhance these protections against executive branch overreaching). 
 17 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
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A. United States v. Reynolds: The Domestic Standard is 
Established 
The formal acknowledgement of the state secrets 
privilege in the United States is, perhaps surprisingly, rather 
recent. The 1953 case of United States v. Reynolds18 stands as 
the seminal case in which the U.S. approach to invocations of 
the state secrets privilege was established.19 
In Reynolds, the family members of three civilians killed 
in the crash of a military plane sought compensation from the 
government for wrongful death. The government asserted the 
state secrets privilege in response to a document request by 
plaintiffs for the flight accident report.20 The trial court directed 
the government to produce the report to the court for a 
determination of privilege.21 When the government refused, the 
judge made an adverse inference and ordered a $250,000 
judgment for the plaintiffs.22 The Third Circuit affirmed the 
decision, noting that a court should diligently refuse to accept 
blindly all claims of privilege; instead, a court should conduct 
an ex parte examination of the evidence to make an 
individualized privilege determination.23 
The Supreme Court reversed, although it agreed with 
part of the Third Circuit’s reasoning in noting that the greater 
the necessity for the allegedly privileged information in 
presenting the case, the greater the need for the court to “probe 
in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is 
appropriate.”24 The Court further reasoned that “[j]udicial 
control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the 
caprice of executive officers.”25 However, the Court 
acknowledged the strength of the evidentiary privilege of the 
  
 18 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 19 For an in-depth account of the Reynolds case, see LOUIS FISHER, IN THE 
NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS 
CASE (2006). 
 20 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3-4. The government also cited to Air Force 
Regulation No. 62-7(5)(b), which precluded disclosure of such reports outside the 
authorized chain of command without the approval of the Secretary of the Air Force. 
Id. at 3-4 n.4. 
 21 Id. at 5. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 996-97 (3d Cir. 1953), rev’d, 345 
U.S. 1 (1953). 
 24 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11. 
 25 Id. at 9-10. 
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executive,26 and noted in passing that some commentators 
believed the privilege to be constitutionally grounded as well.27 
The Court ultimately upheld the right of the 
government to refuse to provide evidence and laid out a more 
deferential analytical framework by which future courts should 
evaluate a claim of privilege: (1) the claim must be asserted by 
the head of the department which has the responsibility for the 
information and evidence in question;28 (2) the court has the 
responsibility to determine whether the disclosure in question 
would pose a “reasonable danger . . . [to] national security”;29 (3) 
the court should take into account the plaintiff’s need for 
information to litigate its case;30 (4) the court should, if 
necessary, undertake an ex parte, in camera review of the 
information at issue to determine whether a reasonable danger 
exists;31 and (5) if the court determines that the “reasonable 
danger” standard is met, the privilege is absolute—it cannot be 
overcome by the plaintiff’s showing of a need for the 
information,32 whether the case involves issues of human rights 
or any other countervailing considerations. 
Given the ease with which the government could satisfy 
the low “reasonable danger” standard, the Reynolds court 
decided that the trial court did not need to examine the flight 
accident report over which the government was claiming the 
privilege, noting that “this is a time of vigorous preparation for 
national defense.”33 If it had ordered disclosure for the court’s 
review, it may have discovered what was revealed only when 
the report was de-classified in the 1990s: there were no 
military secrets in the report, as claimed by the government, 
but there was evidence that the plane lacked standard 
safeguards that might have prevented its crash—the very 
  
 26 Id. at 6-7. 
 27 Id. at 6 n.9. The idea that the state secrets privilege is rooted in the 
President’s inherent constitutional authority was rejected in Tenet v. Doe, which made 
clear that the state secrets privilege is an evidentiary privilege, meaning Congress can 
be involved in setting parameters on the invocation and use of the privilege. 544 U.S. 1, 
9 (2005). 
 28 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8. 
 29 Id. at 10. 
 30 Id. at 11. 
 31 See, e.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190,1204 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (pointing out that the district court had the option of holding an ex parte, in 
camera review of the government’s wiretapping records in accordance with the strict 
procedures of FISA, but that it chose not do so). 
 32 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11. 
 33 Id. at 10-11 (concluding that, given the “circumstances of the case,” no need 
to review the accident report existed because of an “available alternative”). 
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negligence on which the family members in Reynolds based 
their lawsuit.34 The decision by the Reynolds Court to decline to 
at least ascertain whether the document in question contained 
the information claimed to be privileged was a fundamental 
and determinative flaw—one that has been replicated by many 
courts in the intervening years.35 
Reynolds is the only instance in which the Supreme 
Court has articulated a standard for the state secrets privilege; 
given the dearth of U.S. precedent,36 the Court based its 
reasoning on numerous other sources, including the English 
case of Duncan v. Cammel, Laird, & Co.37 decided in 1942.38 
Cammel, Laird’s acknowledgement of a robust evidentiary 
privilege available to the executive was not, however, the only 
basis on which the Reynolds court made its decision; the Court 
also considered other sources, such as earlier U.S. cases 
involving various privileges39 and Wigmore’s treatise on 
evidence.40 Wigmore noted the need for a state secrets privilege, 
but cautioned—even then, in 1940—that the privilege “has 
been so often improperly invoked and so loosely misapplied 
that a strict definition of its legitimate limits must be made,”41 
and that courts, not the executive branch itself, were the 
appropriate decision-makers regarding the privilege.42 
  
 34 Patrick Radden Keefe, State Secrets—A Government Misstep in a 
Wiretapping Case, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 28, 2008, at 28; cf. Herring v. United States, 
424 F.3d 384, 392 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the United States did not commit a fraud 
on the court in its representations during the Reynolds litigation). 
 35 See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 16, at 101 (noting that courts have 
looked at the underlying documents in less than one-third of cases in which the state 
secrets privilege was asserted). 
 36 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7. 
 37 Id. Prior to the Supreme Court decision, the Third Circuit distinguished 
the Reynolds case from the privilege decision in Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., 
[1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.), based on the differences in the nature of judicial roles in 
England and the United States. See Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d 
Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 38 See Nicole Hallett, Protecting National Security or Covering Up 
Malfeasance: The Modern State Secrets Privilege and its Alternatives, 117 YALE L.J. 
POCKET PART 82, 83 (2007), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/589.pdf. 
 39 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7 n.11. 
 40 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2212a(4) 
(3d ed. 1940); see also Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6-7. 
 41 WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 2212a. 
 42 Wigmore further commented, 
Shall every subordinate in the department have access to the secret, and not 
the presiding officer of justice? Cannot the constitutionally coordinate body of 
government share the confidence? The truth cannot be escaped that a Court 
which abdicates its inherent function of determining the facts upon which the 
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In Reynolds, the Supreme Court established a 
standardized doctrine by which to evaluate claims of a state 
secrets privilege; this doctrine balanced national security 
matters with adherence to the rule of law and attention to 
rights of individual litigants.43 However, the balancing test set 
forth in Reynolds has often been subsumed by a judicial 
tendency to uphold claims of privilege without engaging in a 
meaningful analysis of the underlying evidence or the 
government’s claimed need for nondisclosure.44 In recent years, 
that tendency has come under scrutiny as the current war on 
terror has led to numerous lawsuits in which national security 
programs have been implicated. 
B. Impetus for Reform 
Congress took up the question of the privilege in 2008 
for several reasons. First, the “war on terror” has led to highly 
controversial actions such as the National Security Agency’s 
warrantless wiretapping program as well as the extraordinary 
rendition of individuals by the Central Intelligence Agency.45 
Second, the unprecedented level of secrecy46 within the George 
  
admissibility of evidence depends will furnish to bureaucratic officials too 
ample opportunities for abusing the privilege. 
Id. § 2379. 
 43 See also Ilann Margalit Maazel, The State Secrets Privilege, N.Y.L.J., July 
24, 2008, at 3 (noting that the Reynolds doctrine was initially “narrow and sensible”). 
 44 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 16. This judicial tendency is analyzed in 
further detail in infra Part II. 
 45 Although the Obama administration has already begun to modify the 
executive branch’s stance on many of the issues surrounding the war on terror and the 
prosecution of alleged terrorists and enemy combatants, it is unclear how 
administration intelligence programs will ultimately be structured. See Adam Liptak, 
Early Test of Obama View on Power Over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2009, at A1; 
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Great Limits Come with Great Power, Ex-Candidate Finds, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 25, 2009, at A22 (detailing the hurdles to fulfilling President Obama’s 
campaign promises regarding, among other areas, reform of national security policies). 
 46 See, e.g., Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Transparency of 
Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists Win, 57 KAN. L. REV. 579, 596-
98 (2009). One significant shift in information disclosure is the difference in treatment 
of requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) between the Clinton 
administration and the Bush administration. Compare Memorandum from John 
Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., on the Freedom of Information Act to the Heads of all Federal 
Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB84/Ashcroft%20Memorandum.pdf 
(“When you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to withhold records, in whole 
or in part, you can be assured that the Department of Justice will defend your decisions 
unless they lack a sound legal basis . . . .”), with Memorandum from Janet Reno, Att’y 
Gen., on the Freedom of Information Act to the Heads of Departments and Agencies 
(Oct. 4, 1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia_updates/Vol_XIV_3/page3.htm 
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W. Bush administration led to suspicions that the government 
was not necessarily acting in good faith in invoking the 
privilege,47 and that such trends would persist in future 
administrations.48 Further, a “mosaic theory”49 of terrorist 
  
(“The Department [of Justice] will no longer defend an agency’s withholding of 
information merely because there is a ‘substantial legal basis’ for doing so. Rather, in 
determining whether or not to defend nondisclosure decisions, we will apply a 
presumption of disclosure.”). Congress’s attempts to strengthen FOIA in December 
2007 were undermined by the Bush administration’s efforts to have disputes mediated 
by the Department of Justice, as opposed to the less partisan National Archives. See 
Editorial, The Cult of Secrecy at the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at A30. 
 47 State Secrets Protection Act of 2008: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. 78 (2d Sess. 2008) (statement of Steven Shapiro, legal director of the A.C.L.U.) 
(noting the need for reform of the privilege, since “courts need to look at the invocation 
of the state secrets privilege skeptically and make sure it is really being raised to 
protect national security and not to shield government officials from legal and political 
accountability”). In the government’s brief in the case of New York Times Co. v. United 
States, then-Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold wrote: 
[I]n the present case high government officials have explained the reasons for 
their concern; that judgment is enough to support the Executive Branch’s 
conclusion, reflected in the top secret classification of the documents and in 
the in camera evidence, that disclosure would pose the threat of serious 
injury to the national security. 
Brief for the United States at 18, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 
(1971) (No. 1873). Decades later, Griswold conceded, “I have never seen any trace of a 
threat to the national security from the publication [of the Pentagon Papers]. Indeed, I 
have never seen it even suggested that there was such a threat.” Erwin N. Griswold, 
Editorial, Secrets Not Worth Keeping; The Courts and Classified Information, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25.  
 48 In September 2009 the Obama administration released a new set of 
guidelines governing invocation of the state secrets privilege by the administration. See 
Holder Memorandum, supra note 7. Although initial reaction from the public and 
Congress has been positive, many believe that a congressional check is still necessary 
to counteract the potential for abuse within the executive branch. See Charlie Savage, 
Justice Dept. to Limit Use of State Secrets Privilege, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009 at A16 
(“Congress must still enact legislation that provides consistent standards and 
procedures for courts to use when considering state secrets claims. Our constitutional 
system requires meaningful, independent judicial review of governmental secrecy 
claims.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Representative Jerrold Nadler)). 
As of this writing, there is no information as to how the new policy has affected 
executive branch decision-making regarding the invocation of the state secrets 
privilege. 
 49 The court in Halkin v. Helms explained the “mosaic theory” of national 
security as follows: 
It requires little reflection to understand that the business of foreign 
intelligence gathering in this age of computer technology is more akin to the 
construction of a mosaic than it is to the management of a cloak and dagger 
affair. Thousands of bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous information can 
be analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how the 
unseen whole must operate. 
598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See, e.g., Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 405 F. Supp. 
2d 23, 33 (D.D.C. 2005) (reasoning that the mosaic theory justified the government 
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activity would create a broad protection over large swaths of 
relevant information that may not, at least regarding 
individual documents, satisfy the Reynolds standard.50 Third, 
many critics see the state secrets privilege as a broad and 
expansive means for executive branch overreaching in which 
the bad actions of the administration are withheld from private 
litigants and the judicial system, and concealed from Congress 
and the public.51 
The administration’s warrantless wiretapping program 
was challenged numerous times in court, but the government’s 
frequent invocation of the state secrets privilege meant that 
plaintiffs met with little success in pursuing lawsuits against 
the government regarding the program. Specifically, the 
government has invoked the state secrets privilege on several 
occasions52 to protect records that would have allowed the 
plaintiffs to prove that they were subject to wiretapping and 
thus had standing to challenge the program.53  
An emblematic case is that of the al-Haramain Islamic 
Foundation, an Islamic charity based in Saudi Arabia and 
operating worldwide, including in the United States, which 
filed suit against the U.S. government for being subject to 
allegedly unconstitutional warrantless wiretapping of 
telephone conversations by the National Security Agency 
  
decision to not disclose information requested under FOIA); see also David E. Pozen, 
The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE 
L.J. 628, 633-41 (2005) (outlining the history of the mosaic theory as it pertains to 
FOIA litigation). 
 50 E.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec’y Studies. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 933 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding FOIA’s law enforcement exemption with regard to a mosaic 
theory of terrorism); see also ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 564-66 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (upholding, in part, the government’s use of the Glomar Doctrine—
neither confirming nor denying the alleged government activity—to exempt it from 
FOIA disclosure requirements). 
 51 See Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security 
Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1252, 1269 (2007) (arguing that such practices 
extend beyond any particular administration). 
 52 E.g., ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758-66 (E.D. Mich. 2006), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds, 493 F.3d 644, 662-64 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 
S. Ct. 1334 (2008); see also Recent Cases, Federal Courts—Standing—Sixth Circuit 
Denies Standing to Challenge Terrorist Surveillance Program—ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 
644 (6th Cir. 2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 922, 922 (2008) (arguing that standing rules 
should be relaxed under such circumstances). 
 53 E.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 
2007) (“Al-Haramain cannot establish that it suffered injury in fact, a ‘concrete and 
particularized’ injury, because the Sealed Document, which Al-Haramain alleges 
proves that its members were unlawfully surveilled, is protected by the state secrets 
privilege.”); ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 765 (state secrets privilege prevented 
plaintiffs from establishing data-mining claim); Hepting v. AT&T, 439 F. Supp. 2d. 
974, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
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(NSA).54 Al-Haramain was in the unique position of being able 
to offer documented proof that it was subject to NSA 
wiretapping, since the government had accidentally turned 
over transcripts and records of the wiretapping activity to an 
Al-Haramain lawyer.55 The Bush administration sought to 
recover most copies of the report in the possession of Al-
Haramain’s counsel and others, but did not try to recover those 
copies that had been sent outside of the United States.56 
The government moved to dismiss Al-Haramain’s case 
based on the state secrets privilege; the motion was denied, 
although the presiding judge agreed to exclude the wiretapping 
report from the evidence available to plaintiffs.57 The Ninth 
Circuit reversed and remanded the case from an interlocutory 
appeal, holding that because the privilege surrounding the 
wiretapping records was “absolute,” the district court’s decision 
to use affidavits was unacceptable.58 Because the district court 
should not have considered the document in any respect, the 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that plaintiffs could not establish an 
injury in fact, and, therefore, lacked standing.59 On remand, the 
district court was tasked to determine whether Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) preempts the state 
secrets privilege such that the lawsuit could survive.60 The 
court concluded that FISA trumped the state secrets privilege,61 
noting that “[t]he enactment of FISA was the fruition of a 
period of intense public and Congressional interest in the 
  
 54 Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1193, 1195. Specifically, al-Haramain alleged 
violations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-71 
(2007), which governed government surveillance of telecommunications activity, and 
the Fourth Amendment. See Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1193, 1195; see also Carol D. 
Leonnig & Mary Beth Sheridan, Saudi Group Alleges Wiretapping by U.S., WASH. 
POST, Mar. 2, 2006, at A1. 
 55 See Leonnig & Sheridan, supra note 54. 
 56 See Keefe, supra note 34, at 28, 31 (describing how the government did not 
act to recover copies that were sent to Al-Haramain personnel in Saudi Arabia). 
 57 Id. at 31-32. The judge instead ordered that the plaintiffs create affidavits 
based on their recollections of the privileged document. See Al-Haramain Islamic 
Found. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1229 (D. Or. 2006), rev’d and remanded, 507 
F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 58 Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1204. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that the 
district court could have held an ex parte, in camera review of the wiretapping records 
in accordance with the strict procedures of FISA, but that it did not do so. Id. at 1205. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 1206. 
 61 In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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problem of unchecked domestic surveillance by the executive 
branch.”62 
The court reasoned that section 1806(f) of FISA 
governed how sensitive government information resulting from 
surveillance ought to be handled by the courts, and that 1806(f) 
trumped the Reynolds framework for analyzing state secrets 
claims.63 The court went further still, holding that 1806(f) was 
“in effect a codification of the state secrets privilege for 
purposes of relevant cases under FISA, as modified to reflect 
Congress’s precise directive to the federal courts for the 
handling of materials and information with purported national 
security implications. . . . [T]he Reynolds protocol has no role 
where section 1806(f) applies.”64 The district court’s holding 
kept the plaintiff’s claim alive, with Al-Haramain bearing the 
burden of proving surveillance apart from the wiretapping 
records that were inadvertently produced by the government.65 
In April 2009, the district court indicated that the government 
would not have carte blanche to assert the privilege by 
instructing both parties to work together to draft a protective 
order to delineate how classified and sensitive information will 
be treated.66 The court also admonished Obama administration 
lawyers for their continued attempts to garner a stay and delay 
the disclosure of information relevant to plaintiff’s case.67 
A second motivating factor68 for the current push of state 
secrets reform is growing evidence of extreme cases of detainee 
  
 62 Id. at 1115. The court relied on the post-Watergate Church Committee 
Report on the unconstitutional domestic surveillance activities of the Nixon 
administration, see id., as well as the framework for assessing presidential actions 
taken in defiance of congressional will set forth in Justice Jackson’s concurrence in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. See id. at 1116 (citing Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)). 
 63 Id. at 1119. 
 64 Id.  
 65 Id. at 1131. 
 66 Order at 2-3, In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 06-
1791 VRW). In doing so, the court also rejected a far-reaching argument by the Obama 
administration that the court had no authority to order that counsel for al-Haramain 
be granted access to classified information over the objection of the executive branch. 
See Government Defendants’ Response to Court Orders Concerning Compliance with 
the January 5 Order and Response to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Case Management 
Report at 7-10, In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. M:06-CV-01791-
VRW). 
 67 Order at 1-2, In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 06-
1791 VRW). 
 68 Other recent cases have also implicated the state secrets privilege, but 
were resolved on other grounds or did not garner as much attention as the El-Masri 
case. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated and superseded, No. 06-
4216-CV, 2009 WL 3522887 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc); see also William Fisher, State 
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mistreatment that have shocked the public: emblematic is the 
case of Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen who was subjected 
to extraordinary rendition by the U.S. government69 in what 
was later acknowledged as a case of mistaken identity.70 
In December 2003, El-Masri was taking a holiday from 
his hometown of Ulm, Germany, to Skopje, Macedonia. He was 
taken into custody by Macedonian authorities while on a bus 
crossing the border from Serbia.71 According to El-Masri, in 
January 2004, he was transported to an airport where he was 
beaten, stripped naked, photographed, and then sodomized.72 
He was then subject to “extraordinary rendition” by the CIA, 
who transported him to a prison in Kabul, Afghanistan.73 
El-Masri was finally released on May 28, 2004,74 after 
having been in captivity for approximately five months, during 
which he was allegedly subject to numerous harsh 
interrogations by the CIA, which included “threats, insults, 
pushing, and shoving,”75 as well as force-feeding through a 
nasal tube.76 Upon his release, El-Masri sought out German 
officials, who launched an investigation regarding his 
allegations of abduction, detention, and abuse.77 
In 2005, El-Masri sued George Tenet, the former 
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the airlines 
complicit in his rendition, and various other individuals.78 The 
  
Secrets Privilege Derails Rendition Suit, ARAB AM. NEWS, July 11, 2008, at 8; Benjamin 
Weiser, Appeals Court Hears Case of Canadian Citizen Sent by U.S. to Syria, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2009, at A39. 
 69 For a full account of Khaled El-Masri’s story of rendition, see JANE MAYER, 
THE DARK SIDE 282-87 (2008). 
 70 See Glenn Kessler, Rice to Admit German’s Abduction Was an Error: On 
European Trip, Rice Faces Scrutiny on Prisoner Policy, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2005, at 
A18; Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 4, 2005, at A1. 
 71 Complaint at ¶ 23, El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) 
(No. 1:05cv1417), available at http://www.aclu.org/images/extraordinaryrendition/asset 
_upload_file829_22211.pdf. 
 72 Id. ¶ 28. 
 73 Id. ¶¶ 29-35 (alleging that El-Masri was blindfolded, shackled, forced into 
a diaper, and rendered unconscious by injections during his transport). 
 74 Id. ¶ 43. 
 75 Id. ¶ 40. 
 76 Id. ¶ 44. 
 77 Id. ¶ 57. 
 78 Id. ¶¶ 65-72 (alleging violations of due process); id. ¶¶ 73-82 (alleging 
prolonged arbitrary detention); id. ¶¶ 83-92 (alleging torture and other degrading 
treatment); see Reform of the State Secrets Privilege: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. 3 (2d Sess. 2008) [hereinafter Privilege Hearings] (prepared statement of 
H. Thomas Wells, Jr., President-Elect, ABA). 
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government argued for dismissal of the suit based on the state 
secrets privilege, claiming that national security interests 
would be compromised if the litigation were to continue, and 
that state secrets were central to El-Masri making his case 
against the government.79 This privilege claim was made 
despite the United States’ admission of the existence and 
operation of a rendition program, as well as the support for El-
Masri’s factual account by German investigators and 
prosecutors.80 The federal district court agreed with the 
government’s claim and dismissed El-Masri’s suit at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage of the litigation, prior to the 
government’s filing an answer to El-Masri’s complaint.81 The 
federal appeals court sustained the dismissal,82 and the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2007.83 
In denying certiorari, the Supreme Court essentially 
chose to let stand the lack of clarity surrounding the standard 
for determining what procedures a court should use to evaluate 
potentially privileged evidence, whether a court should dismiss 
a suit in response to a valid privilege claim, and whether 
dismissal can occur prior to evidentiary discovery or even the 
filing of an answer to the complaint.84 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit decision in Mohamed v. 
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,85 deviates significantly from the 
Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in El-Masri and articulates a 
narrower standard for upholding an invocation of the state 
secrets privilege. In Mohamed, the district court dismissed a 
suit brought by five detainees against a Boeing subsidiary 
allegedly involved in the transportation of the detainees for 
government-directed rendition and torture.86 The district court 
cited many of the same reasons that the courts in El-Masri 
relied on, including the need to dismiss the suit because the 
  
 79 Privilege Hearings, supra note 78, at 3. 
 80 Jennifer Granick, Secrecy Mustn’t Crush Rule of Law, WIRED, June 21, 2006. 
 81 See El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535 (E.D. Va. 2006); Privilege 
Hearings, supra note 78, at 3. El-Masri is only one of many state secrets privilege 
claims which led to dismissal at the pleadings stage. See, e.g., Halkin v. Helms, 598 
F.2d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming a partial dismissal of a suit involving domestic 
surveillance issues). 
 82 See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 83 See El-Masri v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007); Linda Greenhouse, 
Justices Turn Aside Case of Man Accusing C.I.A. of Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2007, 
at A20. 
 84 Privilege Hearings, supra note 78, at 3. 
 85 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 86 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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subject matter at issue was itself a state secret that, if 
revealed, could jeopardize national security interests.87 The 
Ninth Circuit reversed, adhering closely to the standard as 
articulated by the Court in Reynolds and rejecting the 
government’s claims that the suit needed to be dismissed 
outright based on its subject matter.88 The court instead 
remanded the case to the district court, giving the plaintiffs an 
opportunity to prosecute their claim without relying on 
privileged evidence.89 
The dismissal of El-Masri, which was affirmed by the 
Fourth Circuit and was subsequently denied certiorari, in 
conjunction with the recent Ninth Circuit decision in 
Mohamed, make clear that Congress should step in and clarify 
the state secrets privilege.90 The current application of the state 
secrets privilege raises numerous questions that require 
clarification: when the government can invoke the privilege, 
and what can be protected from disclosure;91 whether it is 
appropriate to grant a motion to dismiss based on a state 
secrets claim at the initial pleadings stage;92 the appropriate 
relief for a valid claim of the privilege;93 and how deeply the 
court must examine the government’s claim.94 
More fundamentally, the petition for certiorari by El-
Masri reflects broader concerns that the Reynolds framework 
should be reevaluated in light of serious constitutional issues—
including allegations of gross violations of the right to privacy 
and the right to due process—raised in current cases that were 
not present in Reynolds. Additionally, critics have noted that 
the nature of national security concerns has changed 
significantly in recent decades, and the courts’ ability to 
  
 87 Id. at 1134-36. 
 88 Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 997, 1009. 
 89 Id. at 1009. The Ninth Circuit further clarified that documents considered 
“classified” for Freedom of Information Act purposes are not necessarily “secret” for 
purposes of the state secrets privilege, and that the government had the burden of 
establishing the need for genuine secrecy. Id. at 1006-08. 
 90 It is clearly not in the interest of the executive branch to initiate any 
tinkering with the state secrets privilege, since the current application tends to grant 
most government requests for dismissal or non-discovery. See Editorial, Secrets and 
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at A18 (noting that the proposed Congressional 
measures were necessary given the courts’ reflexive dismissal of cases involving 
national security issues). 
 91 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9. 
 92 Id. at 17-21. 
 93 Id. at 21-22. 
 94 Id. at 22-24. 
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adjudicate cases while protecting sensitive information has 
improved dramatically in the decades since Reynolds.95 
The El-Masri certiorari petition asserted that it was 
time for the Court to revisit the Reynolds standard and the 
state secrets privilege generally, arguing that since Reynolds 
was decided, the privilege has been broadened inappropriately 
and “has become unmoored from its evidentiary origins” and 
now provides a type of blanket immunity for bad actions by the 
government.96 
Indeed, the Bush administration invoked the state 
secrets privilege with far greater frequency, in cases of greater 
national significance, and sought broader immunity for alleged 
bad acts by the government than did previous 
administrations.97 It also extended the ability to classify 
documents as “secret” to additional administrative agencies.98 
These claims of state secrets, as El-Masri noted, have been 
raised frequently at the initial pleadings stage, allowing the 
government to seek dismissal prior to discovery.99 Further, 
courts often have not examined the documents over which the 
  
 95 Id. at 28-29 (citing the frameworks for judicial treatment of sensitive 
information laid out in the Freedom of Information Act, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, and the Classified Information Procedures Act). 
 96 Id. at 12. 
 97 E.g., Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1939 (2007) (“The Bush Administration raised the privilege 
in twenty-eight percent [28%] more cases per year than in the previous decade, and has 
sought dismissal in ninety-two percent [92%] more cases per year than in the previous 
decade.”); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 16, at 100 (claiming that the Bush 
administration is using the state secrets privilege with “offhanded abandon”). Compare 
Chesney, supra note 51, at 1252 (claiming that a survey of the invocation of the state 
secrets privilege in the post-Reynolds era indicates that “recent assertions of the 
privilege are not different in kind from the practice of other administrations”), with 
Video: Ben Wizner, Staff Attorney, ACLU, Panel Remarks at American Constitution 
Society for Law and Policy Discussion: The State Secrets Privilege: Time for Reform? 
(2008), available at http://acslaw.org/node/6503 (claiming that the frequent invocation 
of the state secrets privilege to secure dismissal at the initial pleadings stage is unique 
to the Bush administration). 
 98 See Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that the ability to 
classify documents as “secret” and, therefore, potentially shield them from disclosure in 
litigation, to the department of Health and Human Services, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Department of Agriculture, and the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy). 
 99 See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 
(D. Or. 2006); ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Terkel v. 
AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. 
Supp. 2d 974, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2006); see also Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. 
Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004) (invoking the privilege to terminate a whistleblower suit by 
an FBI translator who was retaliated against); William F. Jasper, Shooting the 
Messenger, NEW AM., July 7, 2008, at 20 (detailing the level of retaliation against Sibel 
Edmonds and her inability to seek recourse in the courts). 
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privilege has been claimed, relying solely on government 
affidavits to determine that the privilege applies and that the 
suit must be dismissed prior to the commencement of 
discovery.100 Given the likelihood of continued litigation raising 
issues of national security for the foreseeable future, re-
assessing Reynolds in light of modern standards is necessary.101 
C. Proposed Reforms 
The 2008 and 2009 proposed reforms mark the first 
sustained attempt by Congress to address the concerns of 
lawmakers, scholars, and activists to allow courts greater 
flexibility in their evaluation and application of the privilege 
while protecting sensitive government information.102 
Both the 2009 Senate and House bills offer a uniform 
set of procedures for federal judges to employ when the 
government asserts the privilege, modeled in large part after 
the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) of 1980, 
which established procedures for the use of classified 
information in criminal trials.103 
Under the proposed legislation, courts would have the 
ability to conduct hearings on the documents claimed to be 
privileged in camera, ex parte, or through the participation of 
attorneys and legal experts with “appropriate security 
  
 100 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 14. 
 101 Critics have argued for many years that the state secrets privilege needs to 
be clarified for courts to apply a consistent standard. See, e.g., Sandra D. Jordan, 
Classified Information and Conflicts in Independent Counsel Prosecutions: Balancing 
the Scales of Justice After Iran-Contra, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1651, 1679 (1991). 
 102 Courts have held that statutes can preempt the application of the state 
secrets privilege. See, e.g., Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 37, 44 (2d Cir. 1958) 
(noting that the Invention Secrecy Act should govern the court’s treatment of sensitive 
evidence instead of the state secrets privilege); In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig., 
564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) has primacy over the state secrets privilege in setting forth the 
parameters of how evidence should be treated during litigation); see also Eric 
Lichtblau, Judge Rejects Bush’s View on Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2008, at A17 
(noting FISA’s limitations on executive branch activities). 
 103 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2006). The Bush administration has pointed out 
that analogizing the use of the state secrets privilege to the application of the CIPA is 
inapposite, since the end result of nondisclosure of government held evidence under 
CIPA is that the government would need to drop its prosecution of a criminal case; in a 
state secrets situation, the proposed reforms would mean that government 
nondisclosure after a court order would lead to an adverse inference which increases 
the likelihood of government liability to private litigants. See Letter from Michael B. 
Mukasey, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Mukasey Letter], available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ola/views-letters/110-2/03-31-08-ag-ltr-re-s2533-state-
secrets.pdf.  
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clearances” to review the materials.104 The bills also require the 
government to produce each piece of evidence it claims is 
protected for in camera review, along with a signed affidavit 
from the head of the agency in possession of the evidence.105 The 
Senate bill also requires the government to attempt to produce 
a non-privileged substitute—such as a redaction or summary—
for any piece of evidence for which the privilege is upheld by 
the court.106 
These proposed reforms mark a stark contrast to the 
current situation in which the government’s common practice 
is to rely solely on affidavits to assert the privilege and move 
for dismissal of a suit.107 Judges would be prevented from 
dismissing cases based on the privilege before plaintiffs have 
had a chance to engage in evidentiary discovery,108 and the level 
of deference to be accorded to the executive branch would 
change from the current standard of giving the “utmost 
deference”109 to administration claims to one in which judges 
give only “substantial weight” to such claims.110 
D. Critiques and Concerns Over Reforming the Privilege 
The 2008 proposed reforms were met with immediate 
and strong opposition from the Bush administration. In a 
March 31, 2008, letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
  
 104 S. 417, 111th Cong. § 4052 (2009). The bill empowers the judiciary to 
implement procedures to ensure that a sufficient number of attorneys with high-level 
security clearances are available to assist with such cases. Id. 
 105 Id. § 4052(b)(1) (providing for in camera hearings except in when the 
hearing relates solely to a question of law). The court can choose to review only a 
sampling of the documents in question, if the review of every document would be 
prohibitively time-consuming. Id. § 4054(d)(2). 
 106 Id. § 4054(e)(2)(B). 
 107 See James Oliphant, Committee Passes “State Secrets” Bill, SWAMP, Apr. 
24, 2008, http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/blog/2008/04/committee_passes 
_state_secrets.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2009). S. 417 section 4054(b) requires that 
the government also provide an affidavit to support a claim of state secrets, and that 
an unclassified version of the affidavit must be made public. 
 108 Id. § 4055 (“After reviewing all pertinent evidence, privileged and non-
privileged, a Federal court may dismiss a claim or counterclaim on the basis of the 
state secrets privilege . . . .”). 
 109 “[U]tmost deference” was also the standard accorded to executive claims of 
privilege in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 685 (1974). 
 110 See S. 2533, 110th Cong. § 4054(e)(3) (as reported by Senator Patrick J. 
Leahy, with an amendment, Aug. 1, 2008). Finally, the Attorney General would have 
been obligated to report to Congress within 30 calendar days “on any case in which . . . 
the state secrets privilege” was invoked, and any member of the House and Senate 
Intelligence and Judiciary Committees would have been permitted to request and 
examine any piece of evidence deemed protected by a court. Id. § 4058(a)(1). 
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then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey offered numerous 
critiques, including that the state secrets privilege is 
constitutionally rooted, and not solely a common law 
evidentiary privilege;111 that the courts are not the appropriate 
decision-makers regarding national security matters;112 that 
other aspects of S. 2533, including reporting requirements to 
Congress, are constitutionally suspect;113 and that the proposed 
reforms would compromise the state secrets privilege to the 
detriment of national security.114 
First, the Bush administration offered the Article II-
based argument that congressional regulation of the privilege 
is overreaching because the state secrets privilege is not a 
purely evidentiary privilege for which the parameters can be 
set by Congress.115 Instead, the Bush administration and other 
critics argued that the state secrets privilege is grounded in the 
President’s inherent executive power,116 a position articulated 
by the Supreme Court in the dicta of United States v. Nixon,117 
and mentioned in passing in a footnote in Reynolds.118 
  
 111 Mukasey Letter, supra note 103, at 2-3. 
 112 Id. at 3-4. 
 113 Id. at 4-5. 
 114 Id. at 5-6. The Mukasey Letter also detailed four other concerns: that the 
state secrets privilege is a well-settled doctrine, the Reynolds standard was appropriate 
for evaluating a claim of privilege, the proposed reforms could affect pending litigation, 
and the proposed amendments lacked clarity as to classification procedures. Id. at 1, 2, 7. 
 115 See, e.g., El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535-36 (E.D. Va. 2006) 
(asserting that the “privilege derived from the President’s constitutional authority over 
the conduct of this country’s diplomatic and military affairs”); Memorandum in Support 
of the United States’ Assertion of State Secrets Privilege at 3-4, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. 
Supp. 2d 258 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 04-CV-249); Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of the United States’ Assertion of the Military and State Secrets Privilege; 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment; and 
Defendants’ Motion to Stay Consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 10, ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 2:06-cv-10204) 
(arguing that the “privilege derives from the President’s Article II powers to conduct 
foreign affairs and provide for the national defense”); see also Chesney, supra note 51, 
at 1308-09 (asserting that the state secrets privilege is best conceived of as an Article II 
privilege with an overlay of evidentiary issues, the latter of which can be regulated by 
Congress). 
 116 See generally JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE (2005) (arguing 
that inherent executive authority during wartime limits Congressional control over the 
conduct of war to the exercise of its spending and impeachment powers).  
 117 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (“Nowhere in the 
Constitution . . . is there any explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to 
the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is 
constitutionally based.”); see Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (“[The 
President’s] authority to classify and control access to information bearing on national 
security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a 
position in the Executive Branch that will give that person access to such information 
flows primarily from this constitutional investment of power in the President . . . .”); 
 
2009] LITIGATING SECRETS 221 
Since Reynolds, most courts have construed the state 
secrets privilege simply as a common law evidentiary privilege, 
created and enforced to protect information when “disclosure 
would be inimical to the national security [interests].”119 In 
2005, the Court decided Tenet v. Doe120 and made clear the 
distinction between applying the state secrets privilege and 
deciding the threshold question of justiciability. In Tenet, two 
foreign nationals who allegedly worked on behalf of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in return for the promise of financial 
support and residency in the United States brought claims 
against the CIA.121 The Supreme Court dismissed the claims of 
the alleged agents based squarely on the justiciability doctrine 
announced in Totten v. United States rather than looking to the 
state secrets privilege for guidance.122 In the course of its 
reasoning in Tenet, the Court clarified that the state secrets 
privilege addressed in Reynolds ought to be viewed as purely 
evidentiary123 in nature.124 
  
El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 303-04 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that the state 
secrets privilege has a “firm foundation in the Constitution”); Halkin v. Helms, 598 
F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am., 371 F. Supp. 97, 100 (D.D.C. 
1974) (noting that the privilege is constitutionally based to maintain an appropriate 
separation of powers). 
 118 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 n.9 (1953) (noting that the 
government claims that the statute determining whether the government can withhold 
documents “is only a legislative recognition of an inherent executive power which is 
protected in the constitutional system of separation of power”). 
 119 In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re NSA 
Telecomm. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Hepting v. 
AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980-85 (N.D. Cal. 2006); see also Al-Haramain 
Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The state secrets 
privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that permits the government to bar the 
disclosure of information if ‘there is a reasonable danger’ that disclosure will ‘expose 
military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.’” 
(quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10)). 
 120 544 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 121 Id. at 3-5. 
 122 Id. at 8-10 (relying on Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875)). 
 123 Other supporters of the 2008 proposed reforms argued that whether the 
privilege has some constitutional roots is irrelevant, since the proposed reforms seek to 
impose the cost of an adverse inference against the government if it does not comply 
with a judicial request for in camera review, but that the government does not 
necessarily lose its case. See Aziz Huq, Dir. Liberty & Nat’l Sec. Project, Brennan Ctr. 
For Justice, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the American Constitution Society for 
Law and Policy Panel Discussion: The State Secrets Privilege: Time for Reform? (Apr. 
4, 2008), available at http://acslaw.org/node/6578. The adverse inference also costs less 
than the remedy applied by the district court in Reynolds, which entered judgment for 
the plaintiffs upon the government’s refusal to produce the flight accident report for in 
camera review. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 5. 
 124 The Tenet Court distinguished the evidentiary privilege from the 
justiciability doctrine articulated in Totten, 92 U.S. at 107 (in which litigation was 
dismissed at the pleading stage in an action to enforce a secret espionage contract, 
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Second, the Bush administration argued that the state 
secrets privilege is best exercised by the executive branch, 
which is owed a high level of deference on national security 
matters.125 For example, the government, in asking the 
Supreme Court not to grant El-Masri’s petition for certiorari, 
cited Nixon for the proposition that “[s]uch deference protects 
the Executive’s Article II responsibility to safeguard national 
security information and accounts for the fact that the 
Executive Branch is in a far better position than the courts to 
evaluate the national security and diplomatic consequences of 
releasing sensitive information.”126 
This argument relied on the premise that judges cannot 
adequately evaluate some issues that relate to national 
security matters.127 The district court in El-Masri emphasized 
this purported judicial deficiency, quoting from the 1948 case of 
C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,128 “the President . . . 
has available intelligence services whose reports are not and 
ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable 
that courts, without the relevant information, should review 
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on 
information properly held secret.”129 
This claim—which if followed to its logical conclusion 
would preclude judicial oversight of almost all national security 
matters—is questionable, since federal courts are regularly 
tasked with dealing with sensitive information related to 
national security issues.130 Further, the ability of the courts to 
  
because the government could neither confirm nor deny the contract’s existence), 
describing Totten as “unique and categorical . . . a rule designed not merely to defeat 
the asserted claims, but to preclude judicial inquiry.” Tenet, 544 U.S. at 6 n.4. By 
contrast, the Court described the state secrets privilege as dealing strictly with 
evidence, not justiciability. Id. at 9-10. 
 125 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (reasoning that courts 
“traditionally show” the “utmost deference” to executive branch requests for privilege). 
 126 Brief for the United States in Opposition at 14, El-Masri v. United States, 
128 S. Ct. 373 (2007) (No. 06-0613), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/statesec/ 
elmasri-govt-opp.pdf (citing Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710). 
 127 See Chesney, supra note 51, at 1267-69. 
 128 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). 
 129 El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 536 n.7 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
 130 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008) (affirming the role of 
the judiciary in determining constitutionality of counterterrorism measures, noting, 
“Security depends upon a sophisticated intelligence apparatus and the ability of our 
Armed Forces to act and to interdict. There are further considerations, however. 
Security subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles.”); see also Weiser, supra 
note 68 (noting the observation of Second Circuit Judge Barrington Parker, Jr. that 
courts regularly weigh in on questions of foreign policy); State Secret Protection Act of 
2009: Hearing on H.R. 984 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and 
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deal with sophisticated and sensitive matters of national 
importance has increased dramatically since the Reynolds 
decision.131 Additionally, the status quo reflects little or no 
judicial check on executive branch overreaching; the proposed 
reforms attempt to rectify that by shedding sunlight on 
executive branch decision-making that would not exist 
otherwise. Although involved executive branch officials would 
have a better and more nuanced understanding of national 
security issues than federal judges, the conclusion that judges 
are thus incompetent to play any significant role in the 
application of an evidentiary privilege—even with the 
protections of in camera review—does not follow. 
Third, the Bush administration strongly objected132 to 
the proposed requirement that the Attorney General report to 
Congress on invocations of the state secret privilege and 
provide copies of privileged documents to members of Congress 
upon request.133 Any President who subscribes to a robust view 
of a unilateralist unitary executive theory134—particularly in 
light of the claim that the state secrets privilege has an Article 
II core—may decide to refuse to comply with the legislated 
state secrets framework based on the theory of constitutional 
  
Civil Liberties, 111th Cong. 24-25 (2009) (statement of Hon. Patricia M. Wald, Retired 
C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia) (asserting that federal courts 
are capable of handling sensitive information related to national security issues). 
Federal courts have dealt effectively with serious national security issues, such as 
terrorism, for many years. E.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 171 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(affirming convictions for conspiracy to attack the World Trade Center in 1993); United 
States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming the death sentence 
for Timothy McVeigh for his role in the 1993 Oklahoma City bombing).  
 131 Various developments have contributed to this trend. One development 
includes the 1958 amendments to the Federal Housekeeping Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 301 
(2006). See Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 777 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (“According to the legislative history of the 1958 amendments, Congress 
was concerned that the statute had been twisted from its original purpose as a 
‘housekeeping’ statute into a claim of authority to keep information from the public 
and, even, from the Congress. 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3352 (1958).” (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); id. (“The House Report accompanying the 1958 
amendment explained that the proposed amendment would ‘correct’ a situation that 
had arisen in which the executive branch was using the housekeeping statute as a 
substantive basis to withhold information from the public. H.R. REP. NO. 85-1461, at 
2 (1958).”). Other developments include the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of 
Information Act, the 1978 creation of the Foreign Intelligence Services Act Court, 
and the 1980 passage of CIPA. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 124-64; THE 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, REFORMING THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 5 (2007), 
available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/52.pdf. 
 132 See Mukasey Letter, supra note 103, at 4-5. 
 133 See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009) (to be 
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 4058). 
 134 See Setty, supra note 46, at 596-98. 
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avoidance.135 If Congress attempted to mandate the Attorney 
General’s reporting to Congress on information related to 
national security, the President may choose to “avoid” a 
potential constitutional question by refusing to enforce the 
legislation mandating the sharing of information.136 However, 
because the judiciary has a central role in evaluating and 
applying the state secrets privilege, the use of avoidance by the 
executive branch may be limited to some extent.137 
Fourth, the administration raised the concern that the 
proposed reforms, if enacted, would lead to the disclosure of 
  
 135 Constitutional avoidance in the executive context has been understood to 
mean that the President can “avoid” a constitutional dispute by asserting his own view 
of his constitutional obligations any time the actions of another branch make an 
incursion onto the constitutional right of the executive to exert its decision-making 
primacy in certain areas, such as in the conduct of war. See Trevor Morrison, 
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1218-19, 
1230 (2006) (critiquing the OLC’s use of avoidance to assert more presidential power 
than is granted under law). Congress attempted to address the question of 
constitutional avoidance through 2002 appropriations legislation that included a 
provision mandating notification to Congress whenever the executive branch chooses 
not to enforce a law as written. See The 21st Century Department of Justice 
Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273 § 202, 116 Stat. 1758, 1771 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530(D) (2002)). The Bush administration appears to have 
engaged in “meta-avoidance” by refusing to comply with the congressional notification 
requirement in the Act. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the 21st Century Dep’t of 
Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1971, 1971 
(Nov. 2, 2002) (noting that § 530(D) “purports to impose on the executive branch 
substantial obligations for reporting to the Congress activities of the Department of 
Justice involving challenges to or nonenforcement of law that conflicts with the 
Constitution. The executive branch shall construe section 530(D) . . . in a manner 
consistent with the constitutional authorities of the President to supervise the unitary 
executive branch . . . .”). Congress continues to attempt to legislate its way around 
executive branch avoidance. E.g., OLC Reporting Act of 2008, S. 3501, 110th Cong. § 2 
(2008) (introduced by Sens. Feingold and Feinstein); Office of Legal Counsel Reporting 
Act of 2008, H.R. 6929, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008) (introduced by Rep. Miller). Both bills 
propose amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 530(D) to obligate the Attorney General to report 
to Congress on non-enforcement of statutes based on OLC opinions claiming 
constitutional avoidance based on the OLC’s reading of presidential power under 
Article II. 
 136 Morrison, supra note 135, at 1250-58. Members of Congress, 
acknowledging the ineffectiveness of Congressional oversight in the face of the 
heightened use of executive privilege and constitutional avoidance, have voiced the 
belief that the courts are the last safeguards of separation of powers. Department of 
Justice Oversight: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 5, 13-14 
(2007) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing Transcript] (statements of Chairman Sen. Leahy 
and Att’y Gen. Gonzales). Senator Arlen Specter has objected to this meta-use of 
constitutional avoidance, noting that even if enforcement of a statute is “avoided” by 
the administration, that avoidance needs to be reported to the appropriate committee 
in the Senate and House of Representatives. Id. at 13. 
 137 It should be noted that there is no layer of judicial oversight for the 
provision of S. 2533 which requires the Attorney General to report to Congress and 
provide documents for inspection which were withheld under the privilege. See S. REP. 
NO. 110-442, at 33-35 (2008). Thus, an administration intent on using the avoidance 
doctrine might do so in the context of this congressional reporting requirement. 
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more state secrets and compromise national security as a 
result.138 Clearly, more information would likely be revealed in 
litigation if the proposed reforms were enacted: S. 417 elevates 
the threshold for nondisclosure from “a reasonable danger” that 
disclosure could harm national security—the standard from 
Reynolds139—to the higher standard that disclosure is 
“reasonably likely to cause significant harm” to national 
security.140 A higher rate of disclosure would be almost 
inevitable with the proposed standard, particularly given that 
the courts, not the executive branch, would make the final 
determination as to the level of potential harm caused by 
disclosure. 
However, it is unclear whether a higher rate of 
disclosure would jeopardize U.S. security interests. Although 
the Bush administration asserted that disclosing information 
regarding administration activities in the war on terror in 
response to oversight attempts would compromise national 
security interests,141 it offered no evidence supporting such a 
claim.142 Further, although then-Attorney General Mukasey 
  
 138 The court in El-Masri acknowledged the potential danger to national 
security in disclosing state secrets during litigation. 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537 (E.D. Va. 
2006) (“[A]ny admission of denial of [the] allegations by defendants in this case would 
reveal the means and methods employed pursuant to this clandestine [wiretapping] 
program and such a revelation would present a grave risk of injury to national 
security.”). 
 139 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 101 (1953). 
 140 See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009) (to be 
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 4051). 
 141 See Setty, supra note 46, at 612; Prepared Statement of Hon. Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States (2006), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/020606gonzales.html; Heidi Kitrosser, 
Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information 
Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1056 (2008) (“[T]he administration has offered no 
explanation of the purported dangers of revealing the program’s very existence beyond 
the vague assertion that, while terrorists surely already know that the United States 
can survey their conversations, knowing about the program would remind them of this 
fact and might lead them to infer that surveillance is broader than they had assumed.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Bruce Ackerman, Terrorism and the Constitutional Order, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 478-79 (2006) (arguing that the rhetoric surrounding the war on 
terror encourages a public and congressional overreaction of ceding powers to the 
President); see also Joby Warrick & Dan Eggen, Hill Briefed on Waterboarding in 2002, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2007, at A1 (offering a second reason for the desire for secrecy: to 
avoid public and international censure over the use of the harsh interrogation 
techniques. When the U.S. interrogation program became known widely in late 2006, 
the uproar from Congress and the public apparently prompted the administration to 
modify its program.). 
 142 See Setty, supra note 46, at 613 (noting that repeated claims by the Bush 
administration that Office of Legal Counsel opinions could not be disclosed because of a 
purported risk to national security were unsupported and ultimately undermined by 
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framed the reforms as creating a “Hobson’s Choice of either 
disclosing classified activities or losing cases,”143 this overstates 
the effect of overhauling the Reynolds standard. The proposed 
legislation would not have mandated government liability if 
relevant evidence were not disclosed to the court, nor would it 
have required the government to turn over the evidence to a 
plaintiff after a court determination that the evidence is not 
privileged. The actual detriment to the government would have 
been a finding of contempt and an adverse inference against 
the government’s case. 
The Bush administration wanted to see a continuation 
of the status quo, and believed that the deferential Reynolds 
standard was preferable to creating a stronger judicial 
oversight mechanism. To date, the common application of 
Reynolds is what still governs, and it is unclear whether the 
Obama administration and a Democratic Congress will pass 
legislation to address the process and rule-of-law problems that 
Reynolds has engendered. To evaluate whether Reynolds and 
its progeny offer the appropriate standard to apply,144 however, 
it is useful to look back at how the U.S. state secrets privilege 
evolved to its current state. 
II. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. STATE 
SECRETS PRIVILEGE 
There is little doubt that the U.S. version of the state 
secrets privilege arose from international sources but has 
evolved independently, particularly since the Reynolds decision 
in 1953. Both the English and Scottish origins of the privilege, 
as well as the development of the U.S. state secrets doctrine, 
provide context for evaluating the proposed domestic reforms to 
the privilege. 
A. The U.K. Origins of the U.S. State Secrets Privilege 
Although precedent from England was not the only legal 
basis for the Reynolds decision, it played an instrumental role 
for the Supreme Court, which had little domestic doctrine to 
  
the Bush administration’s own eventual disclosure of the legal policies); Editorial, 
Politics, Pure and Cynical, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at A22. 
 143 Mukasey Letter, supra note 103, at 6. 
 144 Id. at 1-2, 7 (arguing that Reynolds and the cases following that have been 
deferential to the executive branch articulate the appropriate standard for determining 
claims of the state secrets privilege). 
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rely upon. However, what the Reynolds court viewed as simply 
English precedent actually represented two distinct and, to 
some extent, contrary legal precedents from England and 
Scotland. 
1. English Precedent 
The first indication that crown privilege145 extended to 
protect the government against disclosure of state secrets can 
be found during the reign of Charles I of England.146 The heart 
of the privilege is to protect the public interest by keeping 
sensitive information out of public purview.147 In Charles I’s 
time, the privilege was used to prevent courts from gaining 
jurisdiction over habeas corpus claims of prisoners unless the 
Crown agreed to show cause for the detention.148 This was a 
controversial proposition since habeas rights had existed since 
the time of the Magna Carta.149 Even at the time, commentators 
argued that the Crown was abusing its privilege and that the 
rule of law and government accountability were at grave risk.150 
The Crown’s position on habeas rights was overturned 
by the Petition of Right of 1628, which forbade Charles I from 
divesting the courts of jurisdiction over matters of arrest and 
detention.151 However, the notion of a state secrets privilege 
over security-related information was established and 
uncontested by Parliament or the courts in future years.152 Still, 
the scope and parameters of the privilege remained murky 
even through the 1800s: while some judges believed that a 
court could invoke the privilege sua sponte even absent a 
  
 145 Crown privilege is one of the crown prerogatives, defined by Blackstone as 
“those [powers] which [the crown] enjoys alone.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES 266, 269 (London, A. Strahan & W. Woodfall, 12th ed. 1793-95). 
 146 Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 1, at 13.  
 147 Id. at 14-15. 
 148 Id. at 17. 
 149 Id. at 19 (citing Magna Carta ¶ 39 (1215)). 
 150 Id. at 22. 
 151 Id. at 23. 
 152 Id. at 23-26 (citing Trial of the Seven Bishops, 12 How. St. Tr. 183, 309-11 
(1688) (refusing to require a witness to testify as to the proceedings of a Privy Council 
meeting); Layer’s Case, 16 How. St. Tr. 94, 223-24 (1722) (denying a witness’s request 
to have Privy Council proceedings revealed in court); Bishop Atterbury’s Case, 16 How. 
St. Tr. 323, 495 (1723) (precluding testimony before the House of Lords regarding 
encrypted communications); The Trial of Maha Rajah Nundocomar, 20 How. St. Tr. 
923, 1057 (1775) (denying the claim of privilege over Privy Council records)). 
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government claim of privilege,153 others questioned the erosion 
of individual rights and the rule of law in the face of the 
government’s ability to hide relevant and potentially damaging 
information.154 
Two English decisions—one in the 1860s and the other 
in the 1940s—were decisive in clarifying the state secrets 
privilege in England and laying the groundwork for the 
parameters of the U.S. state secrets privilege as laid out in 
Reynolds. In the 1860 case of Beatson v. Skene,155 the court 
found that “if the production of a State paper would be 
injurious to the public service, the general public interest must 
be considered paramount to the individual interest of a suitor 
in a court of justice.”156 Beatson further broadened the power of 
the government by stating that the judiciary should defer to 
the head of the government department with custody of the 
paper to determine whether to disclose the document.157 
The doctrine of the state secrets privilege was not 
substantially revisited until the 1942 case of Duncan v. 
Cammel, Laird & Co. (“Cammel Laird”),158 a key case cited to 
support an expansive reading of the privilege by the Reynolds 
court. In Cammel Laird, the House of Lords followed the 
reasoning of Beatson to clarify the English standard for public 
interest immunity. The facts of Cammel Laird are remarkably 
similar to those of Reynolds: a British submarine sank in 1939 
during sea trials, which resulted in the death of ninety-nine 
people.159 The families of the sailors who had been killed 
claimed damages from the builders, Cammel, Laird & Co. 
  
 153 E.g., Anderson v. Hamilton, 2 Brod. & B. 156 (1818) (in a suit for false 
imprisonment, Lord Ellenborough denied the plaintiff’s request to compel production of 
correspondence between government officials, even absent a government objection to 
the production, noting that “the breach of the privilege given by the law to such 
communications would be highly dangerous to the interests of the state”); see also 
Chesney, supra note 51, at 1275-76; Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 1, at 28. 
 154 Gugy v. Maguire, 13 Low. Can. 33, 38 (1863) (Mondolet, J., dissenting) (“I 
can not, I ought not for a moment, as a judge living and administering justice under 
constitutional institutions, admit such a monstrous doctrine . . . . A doctrine which 
reduces the judge on the Bench to an automaton, who . . . will bend at the bidding of 
any reckless politician . . . . If that doctrine be law . . . it would be appalling. It would 
be such that no one would feel himself secure.”). 
 155 (1860) 157 Eng. Rep. 1415. 
 156 Id. at 1421. 
 157 Id. at 1421-22 (noting that if the head of a department “states that in his 
opinion the production of the document would be injurious to the public service, we 
think the Judge ought not to compel the production of it”). 
 158 [1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.). 
 159 Id. at 625-26. 
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The House of Lords upheld an affidavit issued by the 
British Admiralty claiming that public interest immunity 
precluded disclosure of the plans of the submarine,160 and 
affirmed the rule of Beatson that the courts should take an 
affidavit claiming public interest immunity at face value: 
“Those who are responsible for the national security must be 
the sole judges of what the national security requires.”161 The 
Lords further held that if a government officer offers a good 
faith affidavit as to the need for nondisclosure, then “the judge 
ought not to compel the production of it.”162 
In reasoning through the secrecy dilemma, the Lords 
first attempted to determine whether the question of the 
appropriateness of in camera review of the disputed 
information was a matter of first impression.163 Counsel for the 
government said that it was not, relying on the Scottish case of 
Earl v. Vass164 for the proposition that courts need not conduct 
an independent review of the materials. Specifically, the Lords 
agreed with the Vass court’s reasoning that the privilege was 
absolute when invoked by the government and that the 
government’s good faith determination of nondisclosure was 
sufficient.165 The Cammel Laird court went on to note that such 
deference to the government would result in an information 
imbalance between the Crown and other litigants, but that 
such an imbalance was necessary to preserve the public 
interest.166 
The Cammel Laird court also looked at Admiralty 
Commissioners v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling,167 in which the 
Inner House of the Court of Session “insisted that the view of 
the government department was final.”168 The Cammel Laird 
court also relied upon the reasoning of Aberdeen Steam to 
support the conclusion that the government was better suited 
to make the final determination of privilege because a court 
  
 160 Id. at 626-27. The court noted that the First Lord of the Admiralty offered 
a sworn affidavit that he and his technical advisers examined the documents being 
requested and determined for themselves that disclosure would be injurious to the 
public interest. Id. 
 161 Id. at 641 (internal quotations omitted). 
 162 Id. at 639. 
 163 Id. at 627-28. 
 164 (1822) 1 Shaw 229. 
 165 Cammel Laird, [1942] A.C. at 631-32. 
 166 Id. at 633. 
 167 Admiralty Comm’rs v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling & Fishing Co., (1908) 
1909 S.C. 335 (Scot. 1st Div.). 
 168 Cammel Laird, [1942] A.C. at 639-40. 
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may find certain information “innocuous,” whereas government 
officials who properly understand the context of the 
information would know better169—one of the same arguments 
offered by the Bush administration in opposition to the 
Senate’s current proposed reforms.170 
The appellants argued that the Lords should undertake 
an in camera review of the documents in question prior to 
making a final determination as to whether the public interest 
immunity applied, to make sure that an impartial party—the 
judges—could appropriately balance the need to maintain state 
security against the possible injustice of nondisclosure suffered 
by an individual litigant.171 The appellants further pointed out 
the inherent conflict of interest in asking government officials 
to make their own determination as to whether a document 
ought to be disclosed.172 The Lords found neither argument 
persuasive,173 ultimately holding that “[t]he practice in 
Scotland, as in England, may have varied, but the approved 
practice in both countries is to treat a ministerial objection 
taken in proper form as conclusive.”174 
Critics have decried the result of Cammel Laird on two 
fronts—first, that the decision cemented the English rule of 
giving “carte blanche to crown privilege;”175 and second, that 
Cammel Laird’s rationale was faulty because it erroneously 
relied on the Scottish case law176 to defend a broad, deferential 
state secrets privilege.177 If Cammel Laird was erroneously 
decided, then—some argue—the U.S. Supreme Court’s reliance 
on English law in Reynolds becomes less well-founded.178 
  
 169 Id. at 640-41. 
 170 See Mukasey Letter, supra note 103, at 3-4. Mukasey argued that national 
security officials “occupy a position superior to that of the courts in evaluating the 
consequences of a release of sensitive information.” Id. at 3 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 171 Cammel Laird, [1942] A.C. at 627-28. 
 172 Id. at 628. 
 173 Id. at 636-38 (noting the need for a broad public interest immunity to 
encourage unhindered discussion among government officials). 
 174 Id. at 641. 
 175 ROBERT STEVENS, THE ENGLISH JUDGES: THEIR ROLE IN THE CHANGING 
CONSTITUTION 27 (Hart 2d ed. 2005). 
 176 Earl v. Vass, (1822) 1 S.C. (S.) 229. 
 177 Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 1, at 31-32. 
 178 Id. at 32. 
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2. Scottish Precedent 
Although the court in Cammel Laird relied on Vass and 
Aberdeen Steam, Scottish law has always had a considerably 
narrower view of the state secret privilege than England. In 
Scotland, the privilege was retained as a limited crown 
privilege, rather than the broad public interest exception that 
is embodied in English law.179 
In fact, the application of the state secrets privilege in 
Scotland has differed greatly from England since at least the 
eighteenth century. The Scottish courts consistently used a 
balancing approach between the need to maintain national 
security and the need for democratic accountability and 
individual rights. That balancing test yielded a much greater 
diversity in results than the deferential English standard. For 
example, in the 1727 case of Stevens v. Dundas, the court 
compelled production of documents over the government’s 
objections.180 In the 1818 case of Leven v. Young, the court 
affirmed that the judiciary—not the government ministers—
have the right to make an independent determination as to 
whether the privilege should allow for nondisclosure of relevant 
information.181 On the other hand, when applying this balancing 
standard on a case-by-case basis, Scottish courts stated that 
the party seeking sensitive information was required to show a 
significant level of necessity for the court to order disclosure.182 
Both Vass and Aberdeen Steam included language that 
supported a significant deference toward the executive in 
determining when the privilege should apply. However, it 
should have been clear to the House of Lords in Cammel Laird 
that Scottish law on the application of the privilege differed 
greatly from English law by assigning a much greater role for 
the judiciary. Nonetheless, the English court conflated the 
English and Scottish standards in Cammel Laird, arguably 
creating the faulty standard that set the stage for Reynolds. 
  
 179 E.g., Whitehall v. Whitehall, [1957] S.C. (H.L.) 30, 37-38. 
 180 See 19 W.M. MORISON, DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF SESSIONS 7905 (1804) 
(discussing the Stevens case). 
 181 See Leven v. Young, (1818) 1 Murray 350, 370 (Scot. 1st Div.). 
 182 Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 1, at 37 (citations omitted). 
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B. History of the U.S. State Secrets Privilege 
Prior to Reynolds, U.S. jurisprudence on the state 
secrets privilege was limited and vague, and failed to set forth 
a standardized doctrine by which privilege claims ought to be 
evaluated. Some scholars argue that the state secrets privilege 
simply did not exist in U.S. jurisprudence prior to Reynolds,183 
but some evidence does exist that courts accepted the general 
notion of executive privilege, albeit in the specific context of an 
informer’s privilege184 and deliberative privilege,185 not a state 
secrets privilege. As early as Marbury v. Madison, the Court 
mentions the existence of presidential prerogatives not 
delineated in the Constitution,186 but does not clarify the nature 
or extent of those prerogatives. In accepting a presidential 
prerogative as a natural derivation of the Crown privilege, the 
Court did not acknowledge the significantly different nature of 
the Crown or the judiciary in England; unlike U.S. judges, 
English judges were not independent from Parliament after 
being appointed.187 Ironically, Marbury is best known for 
formalizing the U.S. doctrine of judicial review, but the 
decision operated under the assumption that there were 
certain executive privileges that may be beyond the purview of 
the judiciary. 
Soon after Marbury, the Court in United States v. Burr, 
in analyzing the defendant’s constitutional right to subpoena 
witnesses and evidence in support of his defense, noted that 
the government’s right to refuse disclosure of evidence did not 
turn on whether revealing the document would “endanger the 
public safety.”188 However, the question of government 
nondisclosure did not actually arise in Burr.189 The Jefferson 
administration did not attempt to withhold any documents 
  
 183 Id. at 43. 
 184 Chesney, supra note 51, at 1280 (describing an informer’s privilege as one 
which “shields evidence of communications between informers and government officials 
to encourage such disclosures”). 
 185 Id. at 1274 (describing the deliberative process privilege as one which 
“provides qualified protection to some government communications to facilitate 
internal discussions and operations”). 
 186 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169-70 (1803). 
 187 Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 51, at 40. 
 188 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,682d). 
 189 Some scholars have argued that the mention in Burr of the government’s 
right to nondisclosure of evidence hints at the court’s belief that public safety ought to 
be taken into account when making determinations of whether evidentiary disclosure 
ought to be ordered. See Chesney, supra note 51, at 1272-73. 
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from production to the court;190 the court stated both that “it 
need only be said that the question [of invoking a privilege to 
prevent disclosure of evidence] does not occur at this time,”191 
and that “[i]f [a document] does contain any matter which it 
would be imprudent to disclose, which it is not the wish of the 
executive to disclose, such matter, if it be not immediately and 
essentially applicable to the point, will, of course, be 
suppressed.”192 Almost twenty years later, an influential 
treatise on evidentiary law mentions the existence of a 
privilege based on public policy, noting that some evidence “is 
excluded because disclosure might be prejudicial to the 
community.”193 
The nature of a state secrets privilege remained 
relatively static until the 1875 Supreme Court decision of 
Totten v. United States.194 The plaintiff in Totten brought suit to 
enforce an alleged government contract for espionage during 
the Civil War;195 the Supreme Court held that it was 
inappropriate for the lower court to hear the case in the first 
place, since “public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit 
in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to 
the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as 
confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the 
confidence to be violated.”196 Totten embodied the idea that some 
claims against the government are simply not justiciable based 
on the nature of the claim being made and the need for 
government secrecy.197 
However, the relevance of Totten to the state secrets 
privilege is open to debate. Although the Reynolds Court cited 
  
 190 Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 1, at 46 (citing 11 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 241 (Thomas Jefferson Mem’l Ass’n of the U.S., 1904)). 
 191 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37 (Chief Justice Marshall also offered the following on 
a potential presidential privilege regarding evidentiary disclosure obligations: “What 
ought to be done under such circumstances present[s] a delicate question, the 
discussion of which, it is hoped, will never be rendered necessary in this country.”); see 
LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 212-20 (2006). 
 192 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37. 
 193 See Chesney, supra note 51, at 1273-75 (citing THOMAS STARKIE, A 
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AND DIGEST OF PROOFS IN CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 106 (Boston, Wells & Lilly ed. 1826)). 
 194 92 U.S. 105 (1875). 
 195 Id. at 105-06. 
 196 Id.  
 197 Some describe Totten as standing for a narrow doctrine covering espionage 
agreements, and distinguishable from the state secrets doctrine. See Ilann M. Maazel, 
The State Secrets Privilege, N.Y. L.J., Jul. 24, 2008, at 3. 
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to Totten as evidence that an evidentiary privilege against 
revealing state secrets existed,198 the Supreme Court stated 
unequivocally in 2005 that Totten does not involve the state 
secrets privilege.199 The Court in Tenet found that Totten dealt 
with baseline questions of justiciability, and the state secrets 
privilege as articulated in Reynolds required a balancing test 
for the admissibility of evidence, which may or may not 
necessitate dismissal of a case.200 
Even setting Totten aside as distinct from the state 
secrets privilege,201 the application of a national security-related 
privilege is found in several cases in the early twentieth 
century.202 Other national-security cases involved the invocation 
of a state secrets privilege in the criminal context. For example, 
in United States v. Haugen,203 a district court acquitted a 
defendant charged with forgery while working under a military 
contract, based largely on the fact that the contract in question 
could not be compelled for production by the government.204 
Although each of these cases dealt with the question of how to 
handle state secrets in the litigation context, they did so 
without a judicial or legislative standard or unifying doctrine in 
place. 
After World War II, the number of lawsuits involving 
questions of state secrets increased significantly, largely due to 
the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act,205 which 
permitted individuals to sue the government for allegedly 
tortious conduct. This development set the stage for the 
  
 198 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1952). 
 199 See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 10 (2005). 
 200 See id. at 8-11. The Court in Tenet noted that, in Reynolds, Totten was 
distinguished as having been “dismissed on the pleadings without ever reaching the 
question of evidence, since it was so obvious that the action should never prevail over 
the privilege.” Id. at 9. The Court further distinguished Reynolds from Totten, noting 
that “[t]he state secrets privilege and the more frequent use of in camera judicial 
proceedings simply cannot provide the absolute protection we found necessary in 
enunciating the Totten rule.” Id. at 10. 
 201 But see Chesney, supra note 51, at 1278 (arguing that Totten is properly 
viewed as part of the spectrum of possible determinations after a government claim of 
state secrets privilege). 
 202 E.g., Pollen v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 673, 674, 680-81, 684 (Ct. Cl. 1937) 
(dismissing a suit involving gun designs); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 
583, 583, 585-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) (citing Totten in the decision to deny a discovery 
request); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353, 355 (E.D. Pa. 
1912) (citing Totten in the decision to dismiss a suit involving the designs for armor-
piercing projectiles). 
 203 58 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Wash. 1944), aff’d, 153 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1946). 
 204 Id. at 438. 
 205 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2006). 
2009] LITIGATING SECRETS 235 
Supreme Court to establish a standard for the state secrets 
privilege in the seminal case of United States v. Reynolds.206  
The early 1970s saw an increase in the number of 
lawsuits in which the government invoked the state secrets 
privilege.207 This trend was fueled by several factors. In 1971 
the Supreme Court held in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics that private litigants 
could seek compensation for the government’s constitutional 
violations, which opened the door for numerous types of 
lawsuits against the government.208 Further, the Watergate 
scandal broke and propelled a massive push for government 
accountability, including the fortification of the Freedom of 
Information Act,209 the establishment of additional 
congressional oversight mechanisms, and the passage of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.210 
As oversight and lawsuits increased, the state secrets 
privilege offered a mechanism for the executive branch to both 
protect sensitive national security information and avoid 
higher levels of transparency and accountability.211 The problem 
faced by courts has been determining which of these two 
administrative motivations was at play in a given situation, 
and to navigate the interbranch tension inherent in a 
confrontation with an executive branch assertion of power. The 
result has often been that courts decline to get involved in the 
process of weighing evidence altogether: in fact, since 1990, 
judges have conducted an in camera review of documents over 
which the privilege has been claimed in only about twenty 
percent of state secrets privilege cases.212 
In the post-September 11, 2001 era, the question of 
proper invocation of the state secrets privilege resurfaced, 
particularly in light of controversial programs such as 
warrantless surveillance and extraordinary rendition. Some of 
  
 206 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 207 See Chesney, supra note 51, at 1292-93 (listing several cases during the 
1970s in which the state secrets privilege was invoked).  
 208 See 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (citations omitted). 
 209 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). 
 210 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801) (1978). 
 211 Posting of Bill Weaver to National Security Advisors Blog, 
http://natseclaw.typepad.com/natseclaw/2007/05/ok_lets_stop_ta.html (May 16, 2007, 23:04). 
 212 Id.; see also Ryan Singel, Feds Go All Out to Kill Spy Suit, WIRED.COM, 
May 2, 2006, http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2006/05/70785 (quoting 
Stephen Aftergood, director of the Project on Government Secrecy, as saying that the 
lack of in camera inspections reflects a “judicial lack of self-confidence in the fact of 
national security claims made by the executive branch”). 
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the state secrets cases in the post-September 11 era have 
involved government attempts to prevent the disclosure of 
technical information related to military issues,213 somewhat 
akin to the situation in Reynolds. Other cases involved 
government contracting and business management issues,214 or 
internal policies and procedures arguably related to national 
security.215 Finally, in cases like El-Masri and Al-Haramain, the 
privilege was invoked to terminate litigation that involved 
allegations of gross violations of individual civil and human 
rights.216 
III. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE SECRETS 
PRIVILEGE 
In establishing the U.S. doctrine of the state secrets 
privilege, the Reynolds court relied significantly on the English 
precedent of Cammel Laird—and inherent in that decision, an 
arguably incorrect reading of Scottish law as well. This Part 
evaluates how the Scottish and English versions of the state 
secrets privilege, known as public interest immunity, have 
evolved since the decision in Reynolds. This analysis provides 
context for evaluating the evolution of the U.S. doctrine since 
the 1950s, as well as the recent domestic reform efforts. This 
Part also examines how countries facing significant national 
  
 213 E.g., Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1262-63 (Fed. Cir. 
2005); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(upholding the claim of state secrets privilege); DTM Research, LLC v. AT&T Corp., 
245 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding claim of state secrets privilege and quashing a 
subpoena for government’s information on data mining); United States ex rel. Schwartz 
v. TRW, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 388, 393-94 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that the government had 
not met the technical requirements of the Reynolds standard). 
 214 E.g., Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 341 (4th Cir. 2005) (upholding claim 
of privilege to dismiss a Title VII complaint related to employment discrimination); 
Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(upholding claim of privilege to dismiss a complaint related to fraudulent contracting); 
see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005) (dismissing the complaint based on the 
precedent of Totten, not on the state secrets privilege per se). 
 215 E.g., Tenenbaum v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776, 777-78 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(affirming summary judgment in a case alleging religious discrimination as the 
motivation for a counterintelligence operation); Darby v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 74 Fed. 
App’x 813, 814 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment in a whistleblower suit); 
Trulock v. Lee, 66 Fed. App’x 472, 473-78 (4th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of 
complaint in a case alleging defamation during a counterintelligence operation); 
Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 82, 84 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(quashing, in part, deposition subpoena in whistleblower’s claim regarding security 
breaches); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67, 81-82 (D.D.C. 
2004) (dismissing complaint in whistleblower case). 
 216 See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1192-93 (9th 
Cir. 2007); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532-33 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
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security challenges that rely heavily on U.K. precedent—such 
as Israel and India—deal with questions of state secrets during 
litigation.217 
A. Scotland 
In the years after Reynolds was decided, Scottish courts 
clarified that Vass—albeit misread by the English court in 
Cammel Laird—does not support a broader right by the 
Scottish government to invoke the state secrets privilege with 
little or no review by the courts.218 The 1956 case of Glasgow v. 
Central Land Board noted that for Scotland to follow the 
English rule 
would be to go far along the roads towards subordinating the Courts of 
Justice to the policy of the Executive, and to regulating the extent to which 
justice could be done by the limits within which that policy would permit it to 
be done. This has never been the law of Scotland.219 
Glasgow was the first case after Cammel Laird and 
Reynolds were decided to clarify the differences between 
Scottish and English law. In Glasgow, the Law Lords 
specifically acknowledged that the rationale of Cammel Laird 
did not apply to Scottish cases, as “an inherent power in the 
Court of Scotland provides an ultimate safeguard of justice in 
that country which is denied to a litigant in England,”220 and 
noted that should the Lords have to judge a Scottish appeal 
regarding the public interest privilege, they would “be jealous 
to preserve [the Scottish rights].”221 
This distinction between the Scottish and English 
approaches was revisited in Conway v. Rimmer in 1968.222 The 
Lords articulated the Scottish standard, that “[i]f, on balance, 
considering the likely importance of the document in the case 
before it, the court considers that it should probably be 
produced, it should generally examine the document before 
  
 217 India and Israel provide useful comparative examples because they are 
functioning democratic nations with constitutionally mandated separation of powers, 
they face serious ongoing national security threats, and, like the United States in the 
context of the state secrets privilege, derive some legal processes from the United 
Kingdom. 
 218 E.g., Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] A.C. 910, 960-61 (H.L.). 
 219 Whitehall v. Whitehall, [1957] S.C. (H.L.) 30, 37 (citing Glasgow v. Cent. 
Land Bd., [1956] S.C. (H.L.) 1, 11). 
 220 Glasgow, [1956] S.C. at 9-10. 
 221 Id. at 11. 
 222 Conway, [1968] A.C. 910. 
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ordering the production.”223 The court ultimately decided, 
despite the government’s affidavit to the contrary, that any 
harm from disclosure was minimal, and that the documents in 
question should be produced, as they were “vital to the 
litigation.”224 
The Court did, however, set forth guidelines defining 
when greater deference was due to the executive, applicable to 
documents concerning the national defense, documents “of a 
political nature, such as high state papers,” and departmental 
papers involving issues of public interest.225 On the other side of 
the balancing test, Crown litigation related to accidents 
involving government employees and on government premises 
are areas in which “Crown privilege ought not to be claimed . . . 
and we propose not to do so in the future.”226 In creating a more 
detailed approach to the balancing test, the court openly 
acknowledged that “[i]mmunity from unauthorised disclosure 
and from accountability are two sides of the same coin,”227 which 
informs the Court’s careful and narrow approach to applying 
the privilege. 
The Conway court also specifically undertook a 
dissection of the Cammel Laird228 opinion that conflated the 
English and Scottish standards, concluding that the Cammel 
Laird court’s determination to uphold the claim of public 
interest privilege was correct, but that the muddling of the 
Scottish standard was not.229 The Lords ultimately concluded 
that: 
it is worth remembering that the conclusion [in Cammel Laird] was 
reached under a misapprehension as to the corresponding law of 
Scotland. The Scottish cases show that although seldom exercised 
the residual power of the court to inspect and if necessary order 
production of documents is claimed. By a misapprehension, however, 
in Duncan’s case the protection in Crown privilege cases in both 
countries was held to be absolute. This misapprehension no longer 
  
 223 Id. at 911. 
 224 Id. at 911, 918. The court noted that there is no case in which the executive 
becomes the “final arbiter of the privilege claimed,” since that right is reserved solely 
for the court. Id. at 918. The court also reaffirmed its right to examine documents in 
camera in order to make its privilege determination. Id. 
 225 Id. at 920, 937. 
 226 Conway, [1968] A.C. at 923. 
 227 Id. at 924. 
 228 Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624. 
 229 Conway, [1968] A.C. at 938. 
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prevails since the decision of this House in Glasgow Corporation v. 
Central Land Board.230 
The Scottish balancing test enunciated in Conway 
continues to be used by courts today and has not been reformed 
significantly since. 
B. England 
In the years since Cammel Laird was decided, English 
courts have continued to afford high levels of deference to 
government officials claiming the public interest immunity, 
and remained reluctant to conduct in camera inspections of the 
documents in dispute. This deference toward the government 
has at times troubled the English courts, as graphically 
illustrated in the February 2009 decision in the case of Binyam 
Mohamed, discussed below. 
One example of deference toward government claims for 
a public interest immunity certificate is the 1983 case of Air 
Canada v. Secretary of State for Trade,231 in which airlines sued 
the English government over increased airline taxes at 
Heathrow Airport. During the litigation, plaintiffs sought 
government documents outlining the reasoning behind the tax 
increase.232 The lower court decided to examine the documents 
in camera, which led to an interlocutory appeal by the 
government.233 The Lords reversed the decision of the lower 
court as to in camera review, stating that when a government 
official has proffered a good faith affidavit as to the need for the 
public interest immunity to apply, the court should give 
absolute deference.234 
The English courts continue to grant extremely broad 
deference to executive decision-making—certainly as broad as 
had been afforded in Cammel Laird and that is applied by U.S. 
courts. English courts often address the invocation of the 
privilege after initial pleadings have been filed; courts have the 
option of examining the documents in camera but rarely do so. 
More commonly, courts uphold a public interest immunity 
certificate (akin to U.S. courts upholding the claim of privilege) 
with regard to the evidence in question and allow the plaintiff 
  
 230 Id. at 977. 
 231 (1983) 2 A.C. 394 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
 232 Id. at 394. 
 233 Id. at 395. 
 234 Id. 
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to continue its case if possible without the benefit of the 
evidence in question.  
However, the ongoing U.K. case of Binyam Mohamed 
highlights the complexities of such deference to the executive 
branch, and how political and foreign policy considerations can 
undermine government accountability for alleged human rights 
abuses. 
Binyam Mohamed is a British resident who traveled to 
Afghanistan in 2001.235 According to Mohamed, he traveled to 
escape a lifestyle that led to drug addiction in England.236 
According to U.S. authorities, Mohamed trained with the 
Taliban in Afghanistan to prepare for an attack within the 
United States.237 Mohamed was arrested in Pakistan in 2002 as 
he attempted to return to the U.K.; he claims that he was then 
detained and tortured in Pakistan, and then transported to 
Morocco, where he was held incommunicado and tortured 
repeatedly during the following eighteen months.238 Mohamed 
alleges that he was then held in Afghanistan for some time, 
and was ultimately transferred to the U.S. detention center at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he was held from September 
2004239 until February 2009.240 
Mohamed and others alleging they were subjected to 
extraordinary rendition by the United States filed suit in 
California in 2007 against the company that operated the 
airplanes which transported the detainees to various detention 
centers around the world.241 In May 2008, the United States 
charged Mohamed under the Military Commissions Act242 with 
  
 235 Profile: Binyam Mohamed, BBCNEWS.COM, Feb. 23, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7870387.stm. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. Mohamed alleges that he was beaten, scalded and cut with a scalpel by 
his captors. See id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Raymond Bonner, Detainee Who Claims Abuse to Return to Britain, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at A5. 
 241 Amended Complaint at 1-6, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 
992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-2798).  
 242 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-950 (2006). 
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conspiracy to commit terrorism,243 relying on confessions which 
Mohamed alleged were elicited under the threat of torture.244 
Mohamed’s attorneys began separate proceedings in 
English courts seeking release of evidence in the possession of 
the British government that the United States had compiled 
against Mohamed.245 In August 2008, a court ruled in 
Mohamed’s favor, concluding that Mohamed’s allegations of 
torture were substantiated and Mohamed had a right to such 
evidence that supported his claim. As part of its ruling, the 
court summarized evidence gleaned from U.S. intelligence 
sources, but redacted that summary after the Foreign 
Secretary issued a public interest immunity certificate 
claiming that state secrets were at issue in Mohamed’s suit.246 
The Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division 
reconsidered in early 2009 whether the public interest 
immunity certificate issued by the Foreign Secretary was 
compelling such that the previously redacted summary with 
evidence of Mohamed’s treatment could not be given to 
Mohamed’s attorneys.247 The public interest immunity 
certificate asserted that the summary report must remain 
undisclosed because the U.S government had threatened to “re-
evaluate its intelligence sharing relationship with the United 
  
 243 This proceeding was later dropped, as the convening judge determined the 
prosecution could not proceed without the use of evidence obtained through torture. See 
William Glaberson, U.S. Drops Charges for 5 Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
21, 2008, at A1. 
 244 Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2008] 
EWHC (Admin) 2048, [38]-[47] (Eng.). 
 245 Profile: Binyam Mohamed, supra note 235. In May 2007, Mohamed and 
several other plaintiffs brought suit against the Boeing subsidiary that allegedly 
organized the “torture flights” of detainees subjected to extraordinary rendition, 
alleging the company’s complicity in torture and other human rights abuses. See 
Amended Complaint, supra note 241, at 4-6. That suit was initially dismissed based on 
the George W. Bush administration’s assertion of the state secrets privilege. Mohamed 
v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134-1136 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (relying 
on Al-Haramain and El-Masri). The plaintiffs appealed this judgment to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which heard argument on the matter in February 2009. 
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended and 
superseded by 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009). At that point, representatives of the Obama 
administration reiterated the Bush administration argument that the suit was 
properly dismissed based on the invocation of the state secrets privilege. See John 
Schwartz, Obama Backs Off a Reversal on Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009. 
 246 Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2008] 
EWHC (Admin) 2048, [150]-[160] (Eng.). 
 247 The court noted that the information in question was “seven very short 
paragraphs amounting to about 25 lines” of text which summarized reports by the 
United States Government to British intelligence services on the treatment of 
Mohamed during his detention in Pakistan. See Mohamed v. Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [14] (Eng.). 
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Kingdom” and possibly withhold vital national security 
information from the United Kingdom should the summary be 
disclosed to Mohamed’s attorneys.248  
The English court laid out the test for balancing the 
public interest in national security and the public interest in 
“open justice, the rule of law and democratic accountability.”249 
The test involved balancing the public interest in disclosure of 
the information and the possibility of serious harm to a public 
interest such as national security if disclosure is made, and 
determining whether national security interests can be 
protected by means other than nondisclosure.250 
The English court took pains to detail all of the reasons 
that disclosure was desirable, including upholding the rule of 
law,251 comporting with international and supranational 
standards,252 ensuring that allegations of serious criminality are 
not dismissed inappropriately,253 maintaining accountability 
over the executive branch of government,254 and protecting the 
public and media interest in disclosure of government 
activities.255 The court also appeared surprised that the United 
States government was apparently interfering in a matter of 
government accountability in another country.256 
In applying the test, the court relied heavily on its long-
standing precedent of offering deference to the executive 
  
 248 Id. [62]. 
 249 Id. [18] (noting that this case revolved around a question of the rule of law, 
not around the rights of an individual litigant). 
 250 Id. [34] (citing R v. H, [2004] 2 A.C. 134, [38(3)]). 
 251 Id. [18], [19]. 
 252 See Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [20], [21], [26], [101]-[105]. 
 253 Id. [25(iv)], [25(ix)]. 
 254 Id. [32]. 
 255 Id. [37] (“Where there is no publicity there is no justice . . . . There is no 
greater danger of usurpation than that which proceeds little by little, under cover of 
rules of procedure, and at the instance of judges themselves.”). 
 256 Id. [67]-[72]. The court noted: 
[I]n light of the long history of the common law and democracy which we 
share with the United States, it was, in our view difficult to conceive that a 
democratically elected and accountable government could possibly have had 
any rational objection to placing into the public domain such a summary of 
what its own officials reported as to how a detainee was treated by them and 
which made no disclosure of sensitive intelligence matters. Indeed we did not 
consider that a democracy governed by the rule of law would expect a court in 
another democracy to suppress a summary of the evidence . . . where the 
evidence was relevant to allegations of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, politically embarrassing though it might be. 
Id. at [69]. 
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branch in matters of national security.257 The court found that 
the Foreign Secretary acted in good faith in issuing the public 
interest immunity certificate;258 that an opportunity for 
government accountability may still exist with ongoing 
investigations within the U.K. into Mohamed’s allegations;259 
and that the position of the U.S. government had not changed 
with the change of presidential administrations.260 The court 
then decided that there was no basis on which it could question 
the Foreign Secretary’s issuance of the public interest 
immunity certificate.261 
In an extremely unusual move, the court re-opened its 
ruling on public interest immunity and in October 2009 
reversed its previous decision to withhold the information 
regarding Mohamed’s treatment by the U.S. government.262 The 
court reasoned that there was an extremely low likelihood that 
the Obama administration would actually withhold important 
intelligence from the U.K. government,263 and noted that “a 
vital public interest requires, for reasons of democratic 
accountability and the rule of law in the United Kingdom, that 
a summary of the most important evidence relating to the 
British security services in wrongdoing be placed in the public 
domain in the United Kingdom.”264 
The series of U.K. court decisions in the Mohamed case 
reflects both the strength of English precedent that mandates a 
  
 257 See Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [63]-[67]. However, the court 
noted that such deference needed to be limited to instances of genuine national 
security, and not cases in which “it appears that while disclosure of the material may 
cause embarrassment or arouse criticism, it will not damage any security or 
intelligence interest.” Id. [66]. 
 258 Id. [62]-[63], [76]-[79] (noting that the Foreign Secretary perceived the U.S. 
threat to be real, and that if the threat were carried out, that U.K. national security 
interests would be seriously prejudiced). See Ministers Face Torture Pressure, 
BBCNEWS.COM, Feb. 4, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7870049.stm 
(noting that Foreign Secretary David Milibrand denied that the U.S. made a threat; 
Milibrand instead stated that the U.S.-U.K. security relationship was based on trust 
and the trust depended on intelligence remaining confidential). 
 259 Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [102], [104], [105]. 
 260 Id. [78]. 
 261 Id. [79]. 
 262 Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2009] 
EWHC 2549, [7] (Admin) (Eng.), Case No. CQ/4241/2008, Oct. 16, 2009 (noting that 
reopening of a case should be done in “exceptional circumstances” if necessary in the 
“interest of justice”). 
 263 Id. at [39], [49], [69vi], [104]. The court noted that the objections made by 
the Obama administration to disclosing the information in question were not as strong 
as the threats made by the Bush administration. Id. 
 264 Id. at [105]. 
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high level of deference to the government in matters related to 
public interest immunity, and the difficulties that courts may 
have in applying that deferential standard when doing so 
implicates the rule of law, individual rights and government 
accountability in matters of serious allegations of human rights 
abuses. The U.K. court in the Mohamed decision weighed the 
balance and ultimately based its decision on the need to 
maintain the rule of law and to allow for some public 
accountability for whatever role the U.K government had in 
maltreating Mohamed.265 
The latest Mohamed opinion is also evidence of the fact 
that although the English and U.S standards on state secrets 
are in some ways very similar, the expansion of the use of the 
state secrets privilege by the Bush administration—and 
supported to some extent by the Obama administration—
reflects a significantly broader privilege being invoked and 
granted in the United States. While U.S. administrations may 
demand broad grants of immunity for bad acts and high levels 
of secrecy in the litigation context, peer nations attempting to 
limit their application of similar privileges are being put in a 
difficult position by the U.S. government.266 
C. Israel 
Israel does not apply a standardized doctrine 
comparable to the U.S. state secrets privilege or the Scottish 
and English public interest immunity. Instead, the analysis of 
a state secrets-type claim turns on two questions: whether the 
case is justiciable, and then, assuming the case survives that 
analysis, how to evaluate potentially sensitive evidence that 
relates to national security matters. 
Unlike the non-justiciability doctrine of Totten, in Israel 
almost any complaint against the executive branch and its 
  
 265 Id. The court continues to withhold the seven paragraphs of information at 
issue pending an appeal by the U.K. government. See John F. Burns, Britain: High 
Court Approves Releasing U.S. Intelligence Documents on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 
2009, at A5. 
 266 See Defendant’s Open Submissions at 6-9, Mohamed v. Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Claim No. CQ/4241/2008, (EWHC (Admin) 
May 11, 2009) (attaching a May 6, 2009 letter from the Obama administration 
reiterating its position that disclosure of information in question—even if made 
unilaterally by English courts over the objection of Her Majesty’s Government—would 
likely lead to the withholding of valuable counterterrorism information from the 
United Kingdom). 
2009] LITIGATING SECRETS 245 
actions is considered justiciable.267 The Israeli Supreme Court 
dismantled various doctrinal barriers to judicial review in the 
1990s, such as standing and justiciability, in order to facilitate 
more private actions.268 Even with an extremely broad grant of 
standing—particularly by U.S. standards—Israeli courts 
undertake a balancing analysis to determine whether national 
security-related litigation ought to continue or be dismissed as 
non-justiciable.269 This is particularly remarkable given the 
difficult national security situation Israel faces.270 
In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel,271 
the central issue was whether preventative strikes undertaken 
by the Israeli military in response to alleged terrorist attacks 
were illegal.272 The plaintiffs challenged the practices of the 
military based on the loss of civilian life in the strikes and 
Israel’s obligations under international treaties and 
international customary law.273 However, before reaching a 
conclusion as to the merits of the case, the court considered a 
challenge by the Government that the suit was not justiciable, 
based largely on national security grounds.274 
  
 267 Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme 
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 153 (2002). 
 268 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British 
and Israeli Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1923 (2004). Schulhofer also notes 
that Israeli government and military leaders seem to accept the judicial safeguards 
that have been put into place to modify the conduct of the administration. Id. at 1931. 
 269 In this regard, the justiciability analysis of Israeli courts can be likened to 
Totten and other state secrets privilege cases which have been dismissed at the 
pleadings stage, for example, El-Masri, based on the supposed centrality of the 
protected material to the claims brought in the lawsuit. 
 270 See, e.g., Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 2005 Isr. HCJ 
769/02. 10, 16, 47; Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 1999 Isr. HCJ 
5100/94, ¶ 1 (“The State of Israel has been engaged in an unceasing struggle for both 
its very existence and security, from the day of its founding.”); Schulhofer, supra note 
268, at 1919 (describing the security risks faced by Israel since its founding). 
 271 Public Comm. Against Torture, HCJ 769/02. 
 272 Id. ¶¶ 1-3. 
 273 Id. ¶¶ 3-6. 
 274 Id. ¶ 9 (the government, in arguing against justiciability, cited Israeli High 
Court of Justice precedent, HCJ 5872/01 Barakeh v. Prime Minister [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 
1, for the proposition that “the choice of means of war employed by [the government] in 
order to prevent murderous terrorist attacks before they happen, is not among the 
subjects in which this Court will see fit to intervene”). In this respect, the Public 
Committee Against Torture case is analogous to the question faced by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Totten. Although the U.S. Supreme Court in Tenet specified that Totten was 
not strictly a state secrets case, the analysis of the justiciability element—given the 
recent trend in the U.S. of claiming the state secrets privilege at the pleadings stage 
and dismissing suits accordingly, see, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 373 
(2007)—is relevant as part of a larger analysis of state invocation of national security 
to curtail litigation. 
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The Israeli Supreme Court considered the broad Israeli 
justiciability doctrine, and assessed both the government’s 
claim of normative non-justiciability—where a court could find 
it cannot try a case because it lacks any relevant legal standard 
to apply275—and institutional non-justiciability—where a court 
has a relevant legal standard to apply, but chooses not to try 
the case due to structural factors, such as confronting an issue 
solely within the purview of a different branch of government.276 
In Public Committee Against Torture, the court rejected 
the notion of normative non-justiciability—that the matter 
does not fall within the realm of law—but applied a four-
pronged standard to analyze the question of institutional 
justiciability—determining whether the courts are the 
appropriate institution to deal with an issue: (1) a case that 
involves the impingement of human rights is always 
justiciable;277 (2) a case in which the central issue is one of 
political or military policy and not a legal dispute is not 
justiciable under the institutional justiciability doctrine;278 (3) 
an issue that has already been decided by international courts 
and tribunals to which Israel is a signatory must be justiciable 
in Israel’s domestic courts as well;279 and (4) judicial review is 
most appropriate in an ex post situation, where the court is 
evaluating particular applications of a government policy, 
rather than the policy itself.280 
If the first and second prongs of the institutional 
justiciability analysis come into conflict in a particular 
situation, courts must undertake a proportionality analysis.281 
Applying these criteria to the situation at hand, the Court 
found that the claims were deeply entwined with alleged 
human rights violations;282 that the suit did not implicate 
political or military policies per se, since the suit did not 
question the practice of targeted strikes generally, so much as 
  
 275 Public Comm. Against Torture, HCJ 769/02, ¶ 48. 
 276 Id. ¶ 49. 
 277 Id. ¶ 50 (citing HCJ 606/78 Oyeb v. Minister of Def., 33(2) IsrSC 113, 124). 
 278 Id. ¶ 51 (citing HCJ 4481/91 Bargil v. Israel 37(4) IsrSC 210, 218). 
 279 Id. ¶ 53. 
 280 Id. ¶ 54. 
 281 Id. ¶ 58 (“Between these two ends of the spectrum, there are intermediate 
situations. Each of them requires a meticulous examination of the character of the 
decision. To the extent that it has a legal aspect, it approaches the one end of the 
spectrum. To the extent that it has a professional military aspect, it approaches the 
other end of the spectrum.”). 
 282 Id. ¶¶ 1-3. 
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the effect of the specific military strikes on individual 
civilians;283 that international courts and tribunals had already 
opined on this issue;284 and that this was the type of ex post 
situation that was most appropriate for judicial review, despite 
the sensitive nature of the claims.285 
Following the court’s rejection of the government’s claim 
of non-justiciability,286 the court determined that targeted 
killings are not, per se, illegal under customary international 
law, and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.287 The 
Israeli Supreme Court has consistently found that executive 
branch national security policy is judicially reviewable, has 
rejected the idea that only the executive branch can adequately 
evaluate a national security-related issue,288 and has expressed 
none of the concern voiced by the Bush administration over 
judicial involvement in the decision to disclose security-related 
documents.289 
Indeed, the Israeli courts have consistently been 
involved in weighing national security interests against human 
rights concerns, and have developed a sophisticated analysis to 
do so. In Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in 
Israel v. Minister of the Interior, Justice Procaccia explained 
the balancing act that Israeli courts undertake: 
The “security need” argument made by the state has no magical 
power such that once raised it must be accepted without inquiry and 
investigation . . . . Admittedly, as a rule, the court is cautious in 
examining the security considerations of the authorities and it does 
not intervene in them lightly. Notwithstanding, where the 
implementation of a security policy involves a violation of human 
rights, the court should examine the reasonableness of the 
  
 283 Id. ¶¶ 8, 51. 
 284 Id. ¶¶ 19-46, 56 (discussing the application of international customary law). 
 285 Id. ¶ 54. 
 286 The institutional non-justiciability argument has been successful in other 
cases. See Bargil v. Israel, 1993 Isr. HCJ 4481/91 (finding executive branch policies 
governing Israeli settlements to be non-justiciable). 
 287 Public Comm. Against Torture, HCJ 769/02, ¶ 63. The court did not 
mention, however, how it would deal with evidentiary issues involving national 
security secrets that may arise as an individual instance of a targeted killing was 
litigated. 
 288 See, e.g., Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor, 1989 Isr. HCJ 680/88. This 
case also reflects how many of the state secrets cases in Israel relate to alleged 
violations of the Official Secrets Act. See id. at ¶¶ 3-7. 
 289 See Mukasey Letter, supra note 103. 
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considerations of the authorities and the proportionality of the 
measures that they wish to implement.290  
Additionally, Israeli courts do not hesitate to use in 
camera review to assess whether a purported national security 
risk is real. For example, in Vanunu v. Head of the Home Front 
Command,291 a case involving a violation of the Official Secrets 
Act, the court undertook extensive in camera review without 
the presence of parties or counsel in order to determine 
whether the information in question, if disclosed, would pose a 
risk to national security.292 The Court ultimately agreed with 
the government’s position that the information needed to 
remain undisclosed. Likewise, in Adalah, the Court found no 
issue with the trial court reviewing privileged material ex 
parte in order to determine whether the government’s claim of 
military necessity in connection with contested national 
security policies was supportable.293 
It is noteworthy that in camera and ex parte review of 
materials in any of these Israeli cases is neither unusual nor 
subject to objection by either party. These decisions represent 
an engagement by the Israeli judiciary in the various national 
security operations utilized by Israel’s military294 and 
demonstrate the importance accorded to rule-of-law issues in 
the court’s analysis.295 
  
 290 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Isr. v. Minister of 
Interior, 2006 Isr. HCJ 7052/03 443, 692-93 (citing Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the 
West Bank [1], at 375-76; Livnat v. Chairman of Constitution, Law and Justice Comm., 
HCJ 9070/00, 810). 
 291 2004 Isr. HCJ 5211/04. 
 292 Id. 
 293 Adalah, HCJ 7052/03, ¶¶ 10-12 (opinion of A. Procaccia, J.) (explaining the 
two-step balancing test undertaken to determine military necessity). 
 294 See Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel, 1999 Isr. HCJ 5100/94, 
¶¶ 38-40 (finding that the Israeli military’s use of physical interrogation techniques on 
Palestinian detainees was not legally protected activity); Hallett, supra note 38; see 
also Deborah Sontag, Israel Court Bans Most Use of Force in Interrogations, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 7, 1999, at A1. 
 295 See, e.g., Public Comm. Against Torture, HCJ. 5100/94, ¶¶ 38-40. The court 
struggled with several national priorities: 
[W]e are aware that this decision does not ease dealing with that harsh 
reality of Israel’s security issues. This is the destiny of democracy, as not all 
means are acceptable to it, and not all practices employed by its enemies are 
open before it. Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied 
behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the Rule of 
Law and recognition of an individual’s liberty constitutes an important 
component in its understanding of security. 
Id. ¶ 39. 
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D. India 
India, like Israel, does not operate under a standardized 
state secrets doctrine. However, India’s approach to requests 
for document disclosure and the need for secrecy is markedly 
different from that of Israel. Indian courts afford an extremely 
high level of deference to executive branch claims of the need 
for confidentiality and secrecy, and although courts undertake 
a balancing test to determine whether the public interest or 
individual rights at stake should override executive secrecy, 
the claim for secrecy consistently prevails.296 
Deference to executive branch decision-making is deep-
rooted, despite the passage of freedom of information statutes297 
and acknowledgement by the Indian Supreme Court that 
freedom of information is a positive right recognized in Article 
19 of the Indian Constitution.298 
This deference in the litigation context is consistent 
with India’s history of granting the executive branch sole power 
to determine whether to disclose information in any number of 
contexts, and applying strict and often harsh enforcement of its 
Official Secrets Act, a legacy of British colonial rule in India.299  
  
 296 E.g., People’s Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., 
(1998) 1 S.C.C. 301 (upholding denial of request for disclosure of information).  
 297 E.g., Freedom of Information Act, No. 5 of 2003; India Code (2009), 
available at http://indiacode.nic.in/; see Richard N. Winfield & Sherrell Evans, Not 
Good Enough: India’s Freedom of Information Bill Has Great Potential to Overhaul the 
Ills of Secrecy and Inaccessibility but There Are Inadequacies that Need to be 
Addressed, 11 NO. 1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 24, 25 (2003). 
 298 S.P. Gupta v. President of India A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 234 (“The concept of an 
open Government is the direct emanation from the right to know which seems implicit 
in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a). Therefore, 
disclosures of information in regard to the functioning of Government must be the rule, 
and secrecy an exception justified only where the strictest requirements of public 
interest so demands.”). 
 299 India operates under the edicts of the Official Secrets Act of 1923 (OSA), 
enforced in India by the British colonial government. See Winfield & Evans, supra note 
297, at 25. Under the OSA, any disclosure of information—intentional or inadvertent—
likely to affect the sovereignty, integrity or security of India is punishable by 
imprisonment for up to fourteen years. Although similar provisions of the Official 
Secrets Act were removed in England in 1989, the provisions of the 1923 Act remain in 
effect in India, despite criticism of its application. See Sarbari Sinha, Official Secrets 
and a Frame-Up, FRONTLINE, May 7, 2005, available at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/ 
fl2210/stories/20050520000607400.htm (addressing how revocation of the Official 
Secrets Act would curb potential abuses of police powers). 
  One of the most prominent examples of an OSA-related arrest and 
detention is the case of Iftikar Gilani, a Kashmiri journalist detained by the Indian 
government for seven months in 2002 and 2003 for an alleged violation of the Official 
Secrets Act. See A. Deepa, Presumed Guilty, Secretly, INDIA TOGETHER, July 14, 2005, 
available at http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/jul/rvw-gilani.htm. Gilani was arrested 
and charged with sedition under Sections 3 and 9 of the Official Secrets Act for 
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Several right-to-information cases are helpful in 
understanding the level of deference accorded to executive 
branch assertions of nondisclosure. S.P. Gupta v. Union of 
India was an early articulation of the view that disclosure of 
information related to government activities ought to be the 
norm, and that nondisclosure should be sanctioned only after a 
balancing test in which the court weighed disclosure against a 
government claim of public interest immunity.300 
However, courts have continued to apply the balancing 
test from Gupta by giving the utmost deference to an executive 
branch claim for nondisclosure in the name of public interest. 
In Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India,301 the Indian Supreme 
Court considered whether to order the publication of 
background documents underlying the Vohra Committee 
Report, a government compilation of information related to 
corruption in all branches and levels of government. Members 
of Parliament, including petitioner Dinesh Trivedi, alleged that 
the Home Minister refused to disclose evidence about 
government corruption, not as a matter of public interest, but 
as a means to avoid government embarrassment.302 The 
government offered an affidavit from the Home Secretary in 
response, affirming that a summary report that had been made 
available to Parliament was accurate, but that additional 
documents could not be disclosed as a matter of public 
interest.303 
The court reiterated the test set forth in Gupta, noting, 
“Sunlight is the best disinfectant. But it is equally important to 
be alive to the dangers that lie ahead.”304 The Court relied 
heavily on the government assertion that publication of the 
report may be injurious to the public interest, and further 
hypothesized that the public furor toward individuals named in 
the report—should it be published in full—could lead to 
harassment and violence.305 The court, therefore, held that 
  
possessing a document that was generated in Pakistan and was publicly available in 
India—clearly not an official secret of the Indian government—and was imprisoned 
under harrowing conditions. Gilani was never tried in court, and was released after 
contradictions in the government’s case were made public. See generally IFTIKAR 
GILANI, MY DAYS IN PRISON (2005) (detailing the arrest and detention experience of 
Gilani). 
 300 S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1982) 87 S.C.C. Supp. ¶¶ 73-74. 
 301 Shri Dinesh Trivedi, M.P. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1997) 4 S.C.C. 306. 
 302 Id. ¶ 6. 
 303 Id. ¶¶ 9-10. 
 304 Id. ¶ 14. 
 305 Id. ¶ 16. 
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publication of the full report and its underlying documents was 
unnecessary.306 
In 2004, the Indian Supreme Court synthesized much of 
the reasoning from its earlier right to information cases in 
deciding the secrecy case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. 
Union of India.307 Here, the court evaluated whether a 
government report on a nationwide nuclear reactor program308 
must be disclosed in response to a request by various citizens’ 
rights groups alleging concerns about the safety of the reactors, 
and over the objection of the government. The Atomic Energy 
Act of 1962 governed the submission and maintenance of the 
report, and contained specific provisions for the government to 
withhold such reports from public dissemination due to a 
concern that disclosure “would cause irreparable injury to the 
interest of the State [and] also would be prejudicial to the 
national security.”309 In this regard, the government’s argument 
in favor of secrecy was bolstered by the statutory language 
authorizing nondisclosure.310 
The citizens’ rights groups offered extensive evidence 
that details of the report—and specific discussion of the safety 
concerns therein—had been made public years before through 
press releases and media interviews.311 Petitioners further 
argued that the public interest of the citizenry to understand 
the potential safety risks of the nationwide nuclear reactor 
program outweighed the purported threat to national security 
that would arise from disclosure.312 
The court acknowledged the fundamental right to 
information as set forth in Article 19(1) India’s constitution.313 
The court also noted that the general rule of disclosure is 
necessary to “ensure the continued participation of the people 
  
 306 Id. ¶¶ 16-20. 
 307 See People’s Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 
(1998) 1 S.C.C. 301. 
 308 The specific report in question was a November 1995 report by the Atomic 
Energy Regulatory Board (A.E.R.B.) documenting safety defects and weaknesses in the 
nuclear reactor system. See id. at Writ Proceedings section. 
 309 See id. (referring to the purpose of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962). 
 310 See id. at Vires of Section 18 of the Act section (noting that Parliament had 
sanctioned the designation of documents as secret according to the criteria of Section 
18 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962). 
 311 See id. at Writ Proceedings section. 
 312 See id. 
 313 Id. at High Court Judgment section; see also INDIA CONST. art. 19, § 1. 
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in the democratic process” and that “[s]unlight is the best 
disinfectant” against government overreaching.314 
However, the court reasoned, the Constitution’s 
protection for the right to information was limited: “Unlike 
Constitutions of some other developed countries, however, no 
fundamental right in India is absolute in nature. Reasonable 
restrictions can be imposed on such fundamental rights.”315 The 
court noted that Article 19(2) of the Constitution gave the 
government the privilege of withholding information in the 
public interest, and reasoned that secrecy was sometimes 
necessary because “[i]f every action taken by the political or 
executive functionary is transformed into a public controversy 
and made subject to an enquiry to soothe popular sentiments, 
it will undoubtedly have a chilling effect on the independence 
of the decision-maker.”316 
The Court also examined India’s Evidence Act, which 
set forth the standard for evidentiary privilege.317 Section 123 of 
the Evidence Act provides an extremely deferential standard 
for government documents: “No one shall be permitted to give 
any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating 
to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer 
at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or 
withhold such permission as he thinks fit.”318 If a lawsuit is 
brought in which disclosure of a previously undisclosed 
document is sought, Section 162 of the Evidence Act allows the 
court to inspect the document, “unless it refers to matters of 
State.”319 The Court found this standard to be consistent with 
the English cases on public interest immunity.320 
The Attorney General volunteered to submit the 
government report to the Court for an in camera review, but 
  
 314 People’s Union for Civil Liberties, 1 S.C.C. at Right of Information section. 
 315 State Can Withhold Information on Vital Issues: SC, TRIBUNE 
(Chandigarh, India), Jan. 11, 2004, available at http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/ 
20040112/nation.htm#1. 
 316 People’s Union for Civil Liberties, 1 S.C.C. at Right of Information section. 
 317 See id. at Criteria for Determining the Question of Privilege section. 
 318 The Indian Evidence Act, No. 1 of 1872; India Code (2009), available at 
http://indiacode.nic.in/. (ch. IX, § 123, Evidence as to Affairs of State). 
 319 Id. (Ch. IX., Sec. 162, Production of Documents). 
 320 People’s Union for Civil Liberties, 1 S.C.C. at Criteria for Determining the 
Question of Privilege section (citing State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 
S.C. 865, which held that “the foundation of the law behind Sections 123 and 162 of the 
Evidence Act is the same as in English Law. It is that injury to public interest is the 
reason for the exclusion from disclosure of documents whose contents if disclosed would 
injure public and national interest”). 
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the Court declined, stating that there were no grounds to 
examine the report itself.321 Instead, the government proffered 
affidavits attesting to the need to maintain secrecy for national 
security reasons, and to the fact that the Atomic Energy Act of 
1962 made specific provisions allowing the government to 
object to disclosure.322 The Court relied on the government 
affidavits regarding potential threats to national security to 
support its decision to deny the petitioner’s claim.323 The 
holding of the case affirmed the strong protection for the 
government’s unilateral decision to withhold information in the 
litigation context, should questions of international relations, 
national security,324 or other deliberative information be at 
issue. This protection remains robust despite language from 
the courts that suggests that disclosure, not government 
secrecy, ought to be the norm.325 
The Court decided People’s Union for Civil Liberties in 
2004, and one year later the Right to Information Act, 2005 
(“RTI”) was enacted by the Indian parliament. The RTI was 
breakthrough legislation in attempting to shed light on 
governmental practices. The passage of the RTI occurred after 
sustained efforts by various groups to incorporate strong and 
enforceable FOIA-type provisions into Indian law.326 
However, the changes envisioned in the passage of the 
RTI have not yet materialized. First, the backlog in the 
processing of RTI claims since 2005 appears to have 
immediately overwhelmed state and national information 
officers charged with responding to RTI requests, bringing the 
RTI request process to a near standstill.327 These delays are 
  
 321 See id. at Conclusion. 
 322 See id. at Writ Proceedings section. 
 323 See id. at A.E.R.B. Report section, Conclusion (in which the Court noted 
that the Attorney General had offered to submit the A.E.R.B. Report to the Court for 
an in camera review, but that the Court saw no need to examine the report itself). 
 324 Although petitioners claimed that the 1995 report did not implicate 
matters of national security, the Court disagreed on the grounds that nuclear material 
was inherently volatile. See id. at High Court Judgment section. 
 325 E.g., D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 S.C.C. 216, 
(“Transparency of action and accountability perhaps are [the two] safeguards which 
this court must insist upon.”). 
 326 The RTI replaced the Freedom of Information Act, which was perceived to 
be too weak in mandating government disclosure. See The Right to Information Act, 
No, 22 of 2005, India Code (2009), available at http://indiacode.nic.in/. 
 327 See Anita Aikara, Information Delayed is Information Denied, DAILY NEWS 
& ANALYSIS, Sept. 7, 2008, http://www.dnaindia.com/dnaprint.asp?newsid=1188257 
(noting that over 15,000 RTI cases were waiting to be processed at the State 
Information Commission level in one state, Maharashtra); RTI Activists Ask for Fast 
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compounded with the backlog of years and sometimes decades 
in the actual litigation of a suit,328 making it difficult to assess 
the full impact of the RTI in terms of genuine changes to the 
Indian judiciary’s approach to sensitive government 
information.  
Second, the RTI loophole for excluding disclosure of 
national security policy is extremely broad and may be used by 
the executive branch to revert to its usual posture of avoiding 
disclosure of information that has only an attenuated 
connection to national security issues.329 From the few RTI 
claims that have been adjudicated within the information 
commission system, it appears that information commissioners 
are viewing the national security exception to RTI as a broad 
mandate for nondisclosure.330 
IV. VIEWING U.S. REFORM EFFORTS WITHIN A COMPARATIVE 
CONTEXT 
Although the current U.S. use and application of the 
state secrets privilege is roughly analogous to that of England, 
the Mohamed case suggests that England’s current application 
  
Case Disposal, DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS, Aug. 23, 2008, http://www.dnaindia.com/ 
dnaprint.asp?newsid=1185178 (noting that the estimated time for an RTI claim to be 
processed in Maharashtra was 18 to 24 months). 
 328 A recent report to Parliament by the Indian Law Minister noted that the 
Indian Supreme Court currently has a backlog of 48,000 cases waiting to be heard. See 
48,000 Pending Cases in SC; 38 Lakh in HCs: Bhardwaj, ZEENEWS.COM, Oct. 20, 2008, 
http://www.zeenews.com/Nation/2008-10-20/477538news.html. 
 329 Historically, Indian courts have granted the utmost deference to the 
executive branch as to when national security policy should be disclosed. E.g., State of 
Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 865 (carving out national security as the 
area in which the Prime Minister can unilaterally decide what information to disclose). 
 330 In one case, the Central Information Commission upheld the denial of an 
RTI request for information by environmental activists regarding the cost of processing 
nuclear fuel at a nuclear reactor then under construction. The Commission reasoned 
that nuclear material reprocessing was a component of the recent India-U.S. nuclear 
agreement, and therefore was central to the strategic and scientific interests of India. 
Although the costs associated with processing were not necessarily sensitive 
information, the Commission found that the “disclosure of this information can have 
unforeseen ramifications because of the sensitivity in the nature of the project on which 
the information is sought.” Right to Information Act of 2005—Sec. 19 Appeal No. 
CIC/WB/A/2006/00878 at 5, Central Information Commission, Nov. 29, 2006 (decided 
Sept. 10, 2007), available at http://cic.gov.in/CIC-Orders/Decision_10092007_08.pdf. 
  In another case, a state information commission relied on the national 
security exception to refuse an RTI claim seeking a memorandum of understanding 
between the government and Dow Chemical Corporation to build a research and 
development facility. See Rajshri Mehta, Govt Rejects RTI Plea on MoU with Dow, 
DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS, Apr. 15, 2008, http://www.dnaindia.com/dnaprint.asp? 
newsid=1159813. 
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of the privilege may be more narrow than that of the United 
States, and that the English court in Mohamed considered 
expanding the scope of its own public interest immunity under 
threat of national security repercussions from the United 
States. The transnational implications of U.S. pressure 
regarding the state secrets privilege may be that even if other 
nations’ courts use a narrower standard for the privilege, those 
standards may be undermined if the U.S. government uses its 
considerable clout to pressure governments to claim state 
secrets in cases where U.S. government actions are implicated. 
U.S. courts are also less deferential to the executive 
branch than India, but much more so than Scotland and Israel. 
The proposed congressional reforms offer some positive steps to 
establish procedural safeguards that strike an appropriate 
balance between national security interests and the rule of law, 
government accountability, and individual liberty. However, 
Congress should consider going further in addressing the need 
for litigation to compensate those who have suffered gross 
constitutional and human rights violations at the hands of the 
government. 
A. Future Reform Efforts Should Consider Explicitly 
Accounting for Alleged Human Rights Abuses 
If the legislative reforms are adopted, the United States’ 
application of the state secrets privilege would align with the 
Scottish courts’ treatment of public interest immunity. 
However, the reforms proffered in the United States fall short 
of the Israeli standard of justiciability in national security 
matters—the Israeli standard explicitly requires consideration 
of allegations of human rights abuses, whereas the proposed 
safeguards in the United States do not.331 
Of course, the Israeli test for justiciability is not directly 
analogous to the United States doctrine regarding the state 
secrets privilege. However, reforms in the United States should 
require courts to consider potential human rights abuses in 
determining whether a lawsuit should go forward, particularly 
with regard to whether a case ought to be ultimately 
dismissed.332 Although the nature of the allegations should not 
  
 331 See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008); State Secrets 
Protection Act, H.R. 5607, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 332 Under S. 2533, such a dismissal could not occur until the discovery phase 
has at least begun. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008). 
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be determinative as to whether litigation should proceed, it 
would be appropriate for U.S. judges—like their Israeli 
counterparts—to undertake a balancing test which accounts for 
the nature of the claim when deciding whether a case ought to 
go forward at the discovery stage. After all, the cases of El-
Masri, Al-Haramain, and Mohamed, and the violations of 
human rights and constitutional safeguards that they 
represent, are at the heart of the impetus for reforming the 
privilege. 
B. Congressional Reforms Should Encompass Both the 
State Secrets Privilege and Justiciability 
Congress should consider proposing reforms that 
encompass both the evidentiary issues of the state secrets 
privilege and the justiciability questions surrounding Totten 
and its progeny. Although the Supreme Court clarified in Tenet 
v. Doe that questions of justiciability should be considered 
independently of the state secrets privilege,333 courts have 
struggled with this distinction.334 It would be appropriate and 
useful for Congress to assist in the clarification between the 
state secrets privilege and Totten’s standard of dismissal based 
on the subject matter of the litigation. 
Such clarification should be undertaken simultaneously 
with state secrets reform because it would close a potential 
avenue for the executive branch to avoid disclosure of evidence. 
The post-Watergate era saw a spike in invocations of the state 
secret privilege precisely because reform efforts had opened 
avenues for individual litigants to seek redress and information 
from the government.335 A partial reform effort which addresses 
the state secrets privilege but not the question of justiciability 
may inadvertently provide an incentive to the executive branch 
to attempt to dismiss cases based on Totten’s non-justiciability 
standard. Congressional reform efforts should include a 
justiciability assessment by which courts dismiss cases that fall 
squarely within the ambit of Totten (involving secret deals 
related to national security and espionage), but should make 
  
 333 Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2005). 
 334 Id. at 11. For example, even the Third Circuit decision in Reynolds 
conflated Totten with aspects of the state secrets privilege. See Reynolds v. United 
States, 192 F.2d 987, 996 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Chesney, supra note 
47, at 1284-85 (arguing that Totten be considered part of state secrets jurisprudence). 
 335 See supra Part II. 
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clear that all other cases should be evaluated under the state 
secrets privilege, with an additional criterion of accounting for 
allegations of human rights abuses. Such a measure would 
preclude subsequent abuse of the Totten doctrine as an 
alternative means for the executive branch to avoid liability or 
disclosure of allegedly sensitive information. 
C. Reforming the Privilege Should Remain a Priority 
The national security programs created or enhanced 
since 2001 as part of the “war on terror” have come under a 
great deal of scrutiny, but very few concrete oversight 
measures have taken hold for a number of reasons. 
Legislative inertia and a high level of deference to 
executive branch decision-making have hobbled many avenues 
for genuine legislative oversight or any kind of substantial 
reform efforts with regard to national security and the rule of 
law.336 This legislative inertia and deference was particularly 
pronounced from 2001 through 2006, when both houses of 
Congress and the presidency were controlled by Republicans.337 
Reform and oversight efforts began to increase when 
Democrats gained control of Congress in 2006 and initiated 
investigations and attempted to pass meaningful oversight 
measures.338 However, the Democratically-controlled Congress 
continued to defer to the Bush administration on most national 
security matters. For example, in July 2008 Congress passed 
amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act which 
stripped jurisdiction over allegations of illegal wiretapping 
from Article III courts, extended executive branch authority to 
conduct warrantless surveillance, and immunized 
telecommunications companies from liability regarding their 
  
 336 See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture 
Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. LAW & POL’Y 455, 464-66 (2005); Peter Margulies, True 
Believers at Law: National Security Agendas, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the 
Separation of Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2005); Sudha Setty, The President’s 
Question Time: Power, Information and the Executive Credibility Gap, 17 CORNELL J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 247, 256-260 (2008). 
 337 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2371 n.264 (2006) (“[C]oncluding that congressional 
committees exercised over 26% more oversight in times of divided government than 
unified government between 1961 and 1977.” (citing JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A 
WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 59-75 (1990))). 
 338 See Setty, supra note 336, at 260-62. 
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assistance to the government in conducting warrantless 
wiretapping of U.S. citizens.339 
The question for Congress in 2009 is how much 
oversight it is willing to exert over a Democratic President, 
particularly as President Obama has recently issued stricter 
internal guidelines for the Department of Justice to use in 
determining whether to invoke the state secrets privilege.340 
Historically, congressional oversight of the executive branch 
falls by the wayside when Congress and the presidency are run 
by members of the same political party. Efforts to reform and 
clarify the state secrets privilege are a rare and clear example 
of legislative initiative to promote genuine oversight and curb 
executive branch overreaching; reform efforts should not be 
derailed by unsupported claims that national security 
programs would be compromised if the reforms to the privilege 
were enacted, nor by a lack of will to create uniform state 
secrets standards when Congress and the President are 
politically aligned. Congress should consider the long-term 
effects of not reforming the privilege and act to restore the rule 
of law and appropriate balance of power among the branches of 
government. 
Second, although public outcry regarding the 
administration of national security programs has been muted 
at times, the cases which serve as the impetus for the proposed 
2008 reforms are specific, public, and graphic—El-Masri’s case 
of mistaken identity resulted in a horrific experience of alleged 
abduction and torture, which was reported widely in great 
detail.341 
Third, whereas various oversight measures attempted 
by Congress have been met with constitutional avoidance by 
the executive branch (where it has refused to enforce portions 
of legislation as written),342 reform of the state secrets privilege 
would avoid the same fate, since the power to apply the reforms 
would fall to the courts instead of the executive branch. If the 
government fails to comply with a court’s request to provide 
documents for in camera review, the government could be held 
  
 339 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1881-1885 (2008); see also Paul Kane, House Passes Spy Bill; Senate Expected 
to Follow, WASH. POST, June 21, 2008, at A18 (detailing the legislation approved by the 
House); Editorial, Spying on Americans, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2007 (condemning the 
legislation for its expansive grant of power to the President). 
 340 See Holder Memorandum, supra note 7. 
 341 See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 69, at 282-87. 
 342 See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text. 
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in contempt or a court could decide to enter a default judgment 
in favor of the plaintiffs, as the lower court in Reynolds did. 
CONCLUSION 
Invocations of the state secrets privilege have occurred 
in every administration since Reynolds was decided and, given 
the current national security landscape, litigation which 
involves sensitive government information is likely to continue 
for the foreseeable future. 
The extensive and expansive use of the state secrets 
privilege by the Bush administration illustrates the need for 
process changes to be implemented in order to deal with the 
most extraordinary situations, when national security concerns 
are heightened and the temptation to abuse power and 
maximize secrecy is at its highest. The Bush administration set 
a precedent that allows President Obama and any future 
president to continue on a path of exerting a tremendous 
amount of political power with very little oversight.343 
The February 2009 decision of the Obama 
administration to embrace the Bush administration’s 
expansive view of the state secrets privilege underscores the 
need for reform as a part of a long term commitment to the rule 
of law even in the national security arena. The administration’s 
pressure on the British government reflects the transnational 
impact of U.S. policies: the broad U.S. interpretation of the 
privilege almost trumped the domestic analysis of the privilege 
by U.K. courts. The long-term effects of such pressure are yet 
to be seen, but the decisions in the Mohamed case reflect the 
possibility that the U.S. application of the privilege could be 
exported more widely under threat to other countries of 
national security repercussions from the United States. 
The Obama administration’s new policy to determine 
whether to invoke the state secrets privilege is demonstrably 
better than the previous policy: the new structure mandates 
layers of review within the Justice Department, including an 
initial determination by a Justice Department official, a 
recommendation by a newly established State Secrets Review 
  
 343 Nat Hentoff, Consider the Constitutions of Obama and McCain as You 
Choose Sides, VILLAGE VOICE, June 17, 2008, at 14 (“Unless explicitly repudiated by 
the next president and prohibited by law, the precedents of the Bush presidency will 
stand. The expanded powers of one president typically are carefully guarded by their 
successors . . . Republican or Democrat.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Prof. David Orr, Oberlin College)). 
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Committee, and approval of the Attorney General before 
invoking the state secrets privilege in court.344 As promising as 
this new policy seems, congressional reform is still needed to 
ensure an external, long-term check on executive branch 
overreaching that would exist independent of what internal 
policy is adopted by an administration. Passage of a strong 
state secrets reform measure can ensure a fair standard in the 
courts and an opportunity for redress for those alleging grave 
violations of civil rights and civil liberties. 
  
 344 See Holder Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2-3. 
